Computers, Privacy & the Constitution

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HyojungKimFirstPaper 4 - 01 May 2022 - Main.HyojungKim
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META TOPICPARENT name="FirstPaper"

It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.

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Location Data Collected from a Cell Phone and the Fourth Amendment

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The Government purchasing Location Data from private companies and the Fourth Amendment

 
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-- By HyojungKim - 14 Mar 2022
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-- By HyojungKim - 14 Mar 2022 (Revised paper)
 
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I revised the paper to reduce the words (it was slightly over 1,000 words). Except for references, now it is under 1,000.
 

Introduction

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There is a huge business making a money with collected location data. At least 75 companies receive anonymous, precise location data from apps whose users enable location services to get local news and weather. These companies sell the data to advertisers. The global market for Location Based Advertising estimated at $63.9 Billion in 2020. This poses serious privacy concerns as cell phone goes wherever its user goes, making it possible to track every detail of its user.
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A cell phone collects and stores intimate and personal data including location history, personal conversations, and photos. There is a huge business making a money with collected location data. At least 75 companies receive anonymous, precise location data from apps whose users enable location services to get local news and weather or other information. These companies sell the data to advertisers. The global market for Location Based Advertising estimated at $63.9 Billion in 2020, and is predicted to reach $133 Billion by 2026. This poses serious privacy concerns as cell phone goes wherever its user goes, making it possible to track every detail of its user.
 
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In Carpenter v. United States, where the Government obtained the location information from wireless carriers, the court held that the government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring a user's cell-site location information records under the Fourth Amendment. But what happens when the Government purchase anonymized location data from a private marketing companies? It is uncertain whether one can apply the Carpenter’s ruling as there are factual differences. The purpose of this paper is to discuss about the current issues in these gray areas.
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It is not surprising that the government is spying on their citizens. German, Polish, and Hungarian authorities have admitted to using Pegasus, and F.B.I. purchased and tested a Pegasus system in 2019 but denied deploying the technology.The U.S. government has purchased the location data from the private market. After Carpenter, the Government have simply purchased location data from marketing companies gathered from several apps, instead of getting a search warrant for wireless carriers. The DHS and IRS had purchased cellphone location data for law-enforcement purposes. The IRS attempted to identify and track potential criminal suspects by purchasing location database. A commercial broker, a company called Venntel, contained location information on millions of U.S. mobile devices, drawn from games, weather apps and other common mobile applications. This leads to the question whether the government can lawfully buy location data from private market.
 
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The government seems to have circumvented the Carpenter’s ruling by purchasing location data from a commercial company

 
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After Carpenter, the Government have simply purchased location data from marketing companies gathered from several apps, instead of getting a search warrant for wireless carriers. The DHS and IRS had purchased cellphone location data for law-enforcement purposes from 2017. The IRS attempted to identify and track potential criminal suspects by purchasing location database. A commercial broker (Venntel) contained location information on millions of U.S. mobile devices, drawn from games, weather apps and other applications.
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Whether the government can lawfully buy and use location data

 
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There is legal uncertainty about whether the IRS or DHS should have obtained warrants under the Fourth Amendment and Carpenter ruling. The Carpenter court noted that the decision is a narrow one, and it does not express a view on matters not before the court such as other business records that might incidentally reveal location information and other collection techniques involving national security. Unlike Carpenter, the data DHS and IRS purchased did not come from wireless carriers but from private data collecting companies. Also, the data DHS used may involve national security. Most of all, the data here is anonymized, not revealing names and cellphone numbers.
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No overarching federal privacy law

 
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Anonymized data and identification

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The government’s purchase and use of location data is not prohibited by federal privacy law. There is no overarching federal privacy law governing the collection and sale of personal information among private-sector companies, including information resellers. Also, no federal statute provides consumers the right to learn what information is held about them and who holds it, and users do not have the legal right to control the collection or sharing with third parties of sensitive personal information.
 
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Anonymized data is not always anonymous. A whole collection of cellphone location data can identify users by tracking routes for many days. They could attach a name to an anonymous dot, by seeing where the device spent nights and using public records to figure out who lived there. If the data is completely anonymous, why would the IRS and DHS have purchased unuseful location data? If the data is anonymous, then it is unuseful. But if the data is useful, then it poses a problem of possibility of bypassing the Fourth Amendment. The fact that IRS had another contract with Digital Envoy for an archive database subscription to a product used to pinpoint users’ geographic location in 2020 shows the data is useful indeed.
 
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The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. Although data does not reveal names and cellphone numbers and IRS and DHS has not purchased specific individual’s location data, data is not anonymous anymore if users can be identified through collecting and analyzing data. Essentially, there is no difference in obtaining the location data from wireless carriers and marketing companies in that they can serve the same purpose in law enforcement and enable arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. Therefore, Carpenter’s ruling can be applied to anonymized data if the Government can identify the user and use data to track location of the user.
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Fourth Amendment

 
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Third-party doctrine and an option to opt-out from tracking

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Government’s purchase and use of location data can pose a problem of possibility of bypassing the Fourth Amendment, but it is not determined by courts yet. GPS data provided from the private company is much more accurate, thus more dangerous, than the cell tower data produced in Carpenter. However, Carpenter does not seem to apply when the government is purchasing a data from a market because of a factual and technical difference. In Carpenter, the government obtained the location information from Carpenter’s wireless carriers in Carpenter. Here, the government is buying personal data from private data collecting companies.
 
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In IRS and DHL case, law-enforcement agencies have concluded that they don’t need a warrant because consumers technically can opt out of such location tracking unlike Carpenter. Regarding the third-party doctrine, the Carpenter court did note that the cell phone location information was not truly “shared” as a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. In fact, these days, phones provide an option to opt out from tracking when using apps. It can be argued that if the users choose not to opt out from tracking, the users are voluntarily turning over information, and therefore have no legitimate expectation of privacy. However, some apps are simply impossible to opt out. How is Google map or a weather app supposed to give information when one chooses not to provide location data?
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Also, third-party doctrine seems to apply since users gave permission to applications to collect their GPS data. Law-enforcement agencies of IRS and DHL have concluded that they don’t need a warrant because consumers technically can opt out of such location tracking. In fact, cell phones provide an option to opt out from tracking when using apps. This is also different from Carpenter since the cell phone location information was not truly “shared” in Carpenter as a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. In most cases, users are voluntarily turning over their location data for application to function, and therefore have no legitimate expectation of privacy.
 
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Furthermore, the court said that the third-party doctrine should not be mechanically applied, and the court should consider (1) the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carrier (2) “the nature of the particular documents sought” and limitations on any “legitimate 'expectation of privacy' concerning their contents.” The data obtained from wireless carriers are basically not different from the accumulation of data of several apps, and no one would have expected the Government to look into one’s long time location history through combination and collection of several apps they used. What the Carpenter court worried about was that with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, and the Government can access deep repository of historical location information at practically no expense or warrant. In this sense, the purchase of accumulated data from several apps are just as same as data from wireless carriers in Carpenter.
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However, the Carpenter court said that the third-party doctrine should not be mechanically applied, and the court should consider (1) the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carrier (2) “the nature of the particular documents sought” and limitations on any “legitimate 'expectation of privacy' concerning their contents.” What the Carpenter court worried about was that with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, and the government can access deep repository of historical location information at practically no expense or warrant. The data obtained from private companies are huge accumulation, and no one would have expected the government to look into one’s long time location history through combination and collection of several apps they used.
 

Conclusion

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The Government seems to have been circumventing Carpenter’s ruling and the Fourth Amendment by simply purchasing location data, and attorneys of IRS and DHS has reviewed if they are violating one. This poses an even greater privacy invasion since the Government can collect enormous amount of data. Although whether the Government violated the Fourth Amendment is undecided yet, their action is against what the Fourth Amendment seeks to secure, which is the privacies of life against arbitrary invasions by government officials.

References

JENNIFER VALENTINO-DeVRIES, NATASHA SINGER, MICHAEL H. KELLER and AARON KROLIK, "Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret", NYTimes (Dec. 10, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html#:~:text=At%20least%2075%20companies%20receive,those%20in%20use%20last%20year.

GlobeNewswire? , "Global Location Based Advertising (LBA) Market Report 2021: Market to Reach $133 Billion by the Year 2026, from $63.9 Billion in 2020" (Feb. 10, 2022) https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2022/02/10/2382926/28124/en/Global-Location-Based-Advertising-LBA-Market-Report-2021-Market-to-Reach-133-Billion-by-the-Year-2026-from-63-9-Billion-in-2020.html#:~:text=The%20global%20market%20for%20Location,12.8%25%20over%20the%20analysis%20period.

Byron Tau, "Homeland Security Watchdog to Probe Department’s Use of Phone Location Data", The Wall Street Journal (Feb. 7, 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/homeland-security-watchdog-to-probe-departments-use-of-phone-location-data-11606910402

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The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment seeks to secure the privacies of life against arbitrary power and to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating. The data purchased by the government is anonymized, but a whole collection of cellphone location data can identify users. The fact that IRS had another contract with Digital Envoy for an archive database subscription to NetAcuity, a product used to “pinpoint users’ geographic location” in 2020 shows the data is useful.
 
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Byron Tau, "IRS Used Cellphone Location Data to Try to Find Suspects", The Wall Street Journal (Jun. 19, 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/irs-used-cellphone-location-data-to-try-to-find-suspects-11592587815
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Whether the government violated the Fourth Amendment is undecided yet, but the government’s purchase and use of location data is against what the Fourth Amendment seeks to secure, which is the privacies of life against arbitrary invasions by government officials.
 
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Lee Fang, "IRS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CONTRACTED FIRM THAT SELLS LOCATION DATA HARVESTED FROM DATING APPS", The Intercept (Feb. 18, 2022) https://theintercept.com/2022/02/18/location-data-tracking-irs-dhs-digital-envoy/
 
You don't need all these words. You should edit fundamentally, not superficially. Go through the draft word by word. Every word not doing work must go. Every sentence should then be rewritten to use fewer words and simpler grammar. What is here could be reduced by half without loss.

HyojungKimFirstPaper 3 - 14 Apr 2022 - Main.EbenMoglen
Line: 1 to 1
 
META TOPICPARENT name="FirstPaper"

It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.

Line: 60 to 60
 Lee Fang, "IRS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CONTRACTED FIRM THAT SELLS LOCATION DATA HARVESTED FROM DATING APPS", The Intercept (Feb. 18, 2022) https://theintercept.com/2022/02/18/location-data-tracking-irs-dhs-digital-envoy/
Added:
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You don't need all these words. You should edit fundamentally, not superficially. Go through the draft word by word. Every word not doing work must go. Every sentence should then be rewritten to use fewer words and simpler grammar. What is here could be reduced by half without loss.

You need to clear up a technical confusion: this has nothing whatever to do with Carpenter. The cell tower data produced in Carpenter is very imprecise: it says what radio cell the p[hone was in. The data available on the private which you are discussing is GPS data, therefore accurate to 15m, compiled from applications running in smartassphones that have been given permission by users to access the smartassphone's internal location sensors.

That would affect the Fourth Amendment analysis, perhaps, where the location information introduced in evidence in a criminal prosecution. But that's unlikely to happen. The purchase of this data is intended to support investigations by finding people. If the person is found, how they were located is unlikely to be a matter of evidentiary interest in any eventual action, which might not be a criminal prosecution. So in order to show that there is a fourth amendment problem you need the real world to oblige, and it hasn't, nor is it likely to. Relying on the Wall Street Journal for your legal analysis isn't a good idea. They wrote a couple of stories based on some tasty leaks from the IGs of the two agencies, probably the result of some internal politics, but they did not locate a constitutional issue: those leaks seem intended to get Congressional interest.

 
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.

HyojungKimFirstPaper 2 - 04 Apr 2022 - Main.HyojungKim
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META TOPICPARENT name="FirstPaper"
Deleted:
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 It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
Line: 9 to 8
 -- By HyojungKim - 14 Mar 2022
Added:
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I revised the paper to reduce the words (it was slightly over 1,000 words). Except for references, now it is under 1,000.

 

Introduction

Changed:
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A cell phone collects and stores very intimate and personal data including location history, personal conversations, photos and even food preference. There is a huge business making a money with collected location data. At least 75 companies receive anonymous, precise location data from apps whose users enable location services to get local news and weather or other information. These companies sell the data to advertisers. The global market for Location Based Advertising estimated at $63.9 Billion in 2020, and is predicted to reach $133 Billion by 2026. This poses serious privacy concerns as cell phone goes wherever its user goes, making it possible to track every detail of its user. In Carpenter v. United States, where the Government obtained the location information from Carpenter’s wireless carriers, the court held that the government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring a user's cell-site location information records under the Fourth Amendment. But what happens when the Government purchase anonymized location data from a private marketing companies? It is uncertain whether one can apply the Carpenter’s ruling as there are factual differences. The purpose of this paper is to discuss about the current issues in these gray areas.
>
>
There is a huge business making a money with collected location data. At least 75 companies receive anonymous, precise location data from apps whose users enable location services to get local news and weather. These companies sell the data to advertisers. The global market for Location Based Advertising estimated at $63.9 Billion in 2020. This poses serious privacy concerns as cell phone goes wherever its user goes, making it possible to track every detail of its user.

In Carpenter v. United States, where the Government obtained the location information from wireless carriers, the court held that the government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring a user's cell-site location information records under the Fourth Amendment. But what happens when the Government purchase anonymized location data from a private marketing companies? It is uncertain whether one can apply the Carpenter’s ruling as there are factual differences. The purpose of this paper is to discuss about the current issues in these gray areas.

 

The government seems to have circumvented the Carpenter’s ruling by purchasing location data from a commercial company

Changed:
<
<
After Carpenter, the Government have simply purchased location data from marketing companies gathered from several apps, instead of getting a search warrant for wireless carriers. The DHS and IRS had purchased cellphone location data for law-enforcement purposes from 2017. The IRS attempted to identify and track potential criminal suspects by purchasing location database. A commercial broker, a company called Venntel, contained location information on millions of U.S. mobile devices, drawn from games, weather apps and other common mobile applications.
>
>
After Carpenter, the Government have simply purchased location data from marketing companies gathered from several apps, instead of getting a search warrant for wireless carriers. The DHS and IRS had purchased cellphone location data for law-enforcement purposes from 2017. The IRS attempted to identify and track potential criminal suspects by purchasing location database. A commercial broker (Venntel) contained location information on millions of U.S. mobile devices, drawn from games, weather apps and other applications.
 
Changed:
<
<
There is legal uncertainty about whether the IRS or DHS should obtain warrants under the Fourth Amendment and Carpenter ruling. The Carpenter court noted that the decision is a narrow one, and it does not express a view on matters not before the court such as other business records that might incidentally reveal location information and other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security. Unlike Carpenter v. United States, The data DHS and IRS purchased did not come from wireless carriers but from private data collecting companies. Also, the data DHS used may involve national security. Most of all, the data here is anonymized, not revealing names and cellphone numbers.
>
>
There is legal uncertainty about whether the IRS or DHS should have obtained warrants under the Fourth Amendment and Carpenter ruling. The Carpenter court noted that the decision is a narrow one, and it does not express a view on matters not before the court such as other business records that might incidentally reveal location information and other collection techniques involving national security. Unlike Carpenter, the data DHS and IRS purchased did not come from wireless carriers but from private data collecting companies. Also, the data DHS used may involve national security. Most of all, the data here is anonymized, not revealing names and cellphone numbers.
 

Anonymized data and identification

Changed:
<
<
Anonymized data is not always anonymous. A whole collection of cellphone location data can identify users by tracking their routes for many days. They could attach a name to an anonymous dot, by seeing where the device spent nights and using public records to figure out who lived there. If the data is completely anonymous, why would the IRS and DHS have purchased not useful location data? If the data is anonymous, then it is not useful. But if the data is useful, then it poses a problem of possibility of bypassing the Fourth Amendment. The fact that IRS had another contract with Digital Envoy for an archive database subscription to a product used to pinpoint users’ geographic location in 2020 shows the data is useful indeed.
>
>
Anonymized data is not always anonymous. A whole collection of cellphone location data can identify users by tracking routes for many days. They could attach a name to an anonymous dot, by seeing where the device spent nights and using public records to figure out who lived there. If the data is completely anonymous, why would the IRS and DHS have purchased unuseful location data? If the data is anonymous, then it is unuseful. But if the data is useful, then it poses a problem of possibility of bypassing the Fourth Amendment. The fact that IRS had another contract with Digital Envoy for an archive database subscription to a product used to pinpoint users’ geographic location in 2020 shows the data is useful indeed.
 The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. Although data does not reveal names and cellphone numbers and IRS and DHS has not purchased specific individual’s location data, data is not anonymous anymore if users can be identified through collecting and analyzing data. Essentially, there is no difference in obtaining the location data from wireless carriers and marketing companies in that they can serve the same purpose in law enforcement and enable arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. Therefore, Carpenter’s ruling can be applied to anonymized data if the Government can identify the user and use data to track location of the user.
Line: 37 to 41
 

Conclusion

Changed:
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The Government seems to have been circumventing Carpenter’s ruling and the Fourth Amendment by simply purchasing location data, and attorneys of IRS and DHS has reviewed if they are violating one. This poses an even greater privacy invasion since the Government can collect enormous amount of data. Although whether the Government actually violated the Fourth Amendment is undecided yet, their action is against what the Fourth Amendment seeks to secure, which is the privacies of life against arbitrary invasions by government officials.
>
>
The Government seems to have been circumventing Carpenter’s ruling and the Fourth Amendment by simply purchasing location data, and attorneys of IRS and DHS has reviewed if they are violating one. This poses an even greater privacy invasion since the Government can collect enormous amount of data. Although whether the Government violated the Fourth Amendment is undecided yet, their action is against what the Fourth Amendment seeks to secure, which is the privacies of life against arbitrary invasions by government officials.
 

References


HyojungKimFirstPaper 1 - 14 Mar 2022 - Main.HyojungKim
Line: 1 to 1
Added:
>
>
META TOPICPARENT name="FirstPaper"

It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.

Location Data Collected from a Cell Phone and the Fourth Amendment

-- By HyojungKim - 14 Mar 2022

Introduction

A cell phone collects and stores very intimate and personal data including location history, personal conversations, photos and even food preference. There is a huge business making a money with collected location data. At least 75 companies receive anonymous, precise location data from apps whose users enable location services to get local news and weather or other information. These companies sell the data to advertisers. The global market for Location Based Advertising estimated at $63.9 Billion in 2020, and is predicted to reach $133 Billion by 2026. This poses serious privacy concerns as cell phone goes wherever its user goes, making it possible to track every detail of its user. In Carpenter v. United States, where the Government obtained the location information from Carpenter’s wireless carriers, the court held that the government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring a user's cell-site location information records under the Fourth Amendment. But what happens when the Government purchase anonymized location data from a private marketing companies? It is uncertain whether one can apply the Carpenter’s ruling as there are factual differences. The purpose of this paper is to discuss about the current issues in these gray areas.

The government seems to have circumvented the Carpenter’s ruling by purchasing location data from a commercial company

After Carpenter, the Government have simply purchased location data from marketing companies gathered from several apps, instead of getting a search warrant for wireless carriers. The DHS and IRS had purchased cellphone location data for law-enforcement purposes from 2017. The IRS attempted to identify and track potential criminal suspects by purchasing location database. A commercial broker, a company called Venntel, contained location information on millions of U.S. mobile devices, drawn from games, weather apps and other common mobile applications.

There is legal uncertainty about whether the IRS or DHS should obtain warrants under the Fourth Amendment and Carpenter ruling. The Carpenter court noted that the decision is a narrow one, and it does not express a view on matters not before the court such as other business records that might incidentally reveal location information and other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security. Unlike Carpenter v. United States, The data DHS and IRS purchased did not come from wireless carriers but from private data collecting companies. Also, the data DHS used may involve national security. Most of all, the data here is anonymized, not revealing names and cellphone numbers.

Anonymized data and identification

Anonymized data is not always anonymous. A whole collection of cellphone location data can identify users by tracking their routes for many days. They could attach a name to an anonymous dot, by seeing where the device spent nights and using public records to figure out who lived there. If the data is completely anonymous, why would the IRS and DHS have purchased not useful location data? If the data is anonymous, then it is not useful. But if the data is useful, then it poses a problem of possibility of bypassing the Fourth Amendment. The fact that IRS had another contract with Digital Envoy for an archive database subscription to a product used to pinpoint users’ geographic location in 2020 shows the data is useful indeed.

The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. Although data does not reveal names and cellphone numbers and IRS and DHS has not purchased specific individual’s location data, data is not anonymous anymore if users can be identified through collecting and analyzing data. Essentially, there is no difference in obtaining the location data from wireless carriers and marketing companies in that they can serve the same purpose in law enforcement and enable arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. Therefore, Carpenter’s ruling can be applied to anonymized data if the Government can identify the user and use data to track location of the user.

Third-party doctrine and an option to opt-out from tracking

In IRS and DHL case, law-enforcement agencies have concluded that they don’t need a warrant because consumers technically can opt out of such location tracking unlike Carpenter. Regarding the third-party doctrine, the Carpenter court did note that the cell phone location information was not truly “shared” as a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. In fact, these days, phones provide an option to opt out from tracking when using apps. It can be argued that if the users choose not to opt out from tracking, the users are voluntarily turning over information, and therefore have no legitimate expectation of privacy. However, some apps are simply impossible to opt out. How is Google map or a weather app supposed to give information when one chooses not to provide location data?

Furthermore, the court said that the third-party doctrine should not be mechanically applied, and the court should consider (1) the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carrier (2) “the nature of the particular documents sought” and limitations on any “legitimate 'expectation of privacy' concerning their contents.” The data obtained from wireless carriers are basically not different from the accumulation of data of several apps, and no one would have expected the Government to look into one’s long time location history through combination and collection of several apps they used. What the Carpenter court worried about was that with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, and the Government can access deep repository of historical location information at practically no expense or warrant. In this sense, the purchase of accumulated data from several apps are just as same as data from wireless carriers in Carpenter.

Conclusion

The Government seems to have been circumventing Carpenter’s ruling and the Fourth Amendment by simply purchasing location data, and attorneys of IRS and DHS has reviewed if they are violating one. This poses an even greater privacy invasion since the Government can collect enormous amount of data. Although whether the Government actually violated the Fourth Amendment is undecided yet, their action is against what the Fourth Amendment seeks to secure, which is the privacies of life against arbitrary invasions by government officials.

References

JENNIFER VALENTINO-DeVRIES, NATASHA SINGER, MICHAEL H. KELLER and AARON KROLIK, "Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret", NYTimes (Dec. 10, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html#:~:text=At%20least%2075%20companies%20receive,those%20in%20use%20last%20year.

GlobeNewswire? , "Global Location Based Advertising (LBA) Market Report 2021: Market to Reach $133 Billion by the Year 2026, from $63.9 Billion in 2020" (Feb. 10, 2022) https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2022/02/10/2382926/28124/en/Global-Location-Based-Advertising-LBA-Market-Report-2021-Market-to-Reach-133-Billion-by-the-Year-2026-from-63-9-Billion-in-2020.html#:~:text=The%20global%20market%20for%20Location,12.8%25%20over%20the%20analysis%20period.

Byron Tau, "Homeland Security Watchdog to Probe Department’s Use of Phone Location Data", The Wall Street Journal (Feb. 7, 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/homeland-security-watchdog-to-probe-departments-use-of-phone-location-data-11606910402

Byron Tau, "IRS Used Cellphone Location Data to Try to Find Suspects", The Wall Street Journal (Jun. 19, 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/irs-used-cellphone-location-data-to-try-to-find-suspects-11592587815

Lee Fang, "IRS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CONTRACTED FIRM THAT SELLS LOCATION DATA HARVESTED FROM DATING APPS", The Intercept (Feb. 18, 2022) https://theintercept.com/2022/02/18/location-data-tracking-irs-dhs-digital-envoy/


You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines:

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