Law in Contemporary Society

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The Risk-Averse Lawyer

-- CaseyBoyle - 14 May 2008 (ready for grading)


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The Risk-Averse Lawyer

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-- CaseyBoyle - 14 May 2008 (ready for grading)
 Sometimes I think it was really my risk-averse nature that led me to law school. Not to belittle my own or anyone else’s career goals, but I often speculate that the legal profession attracts a certain “risk-averse” individual, and that many of my law school peers were similarly guided by their own cautious tendencies.

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The Risk-Averse Lawyer

 
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The Cautious Lawyer and the Risk-Averse Legal Profession

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-- CaseyBoyle - 14 May 2008
 
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-- CaseyBoyle - 05 Apr 2008
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Sometimes I think it was really my risk-averse nature that led me to law school. Not to belittle my own or anyone else’s career goals, but I often speculate that the legal profession attracts a certain “risk-averse” individual, and that many of my law school peers were similarly guided by their own cautious tendencies.
 
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Many lawyers are risk-averse. These lawyers are risk-averse by nature because the legal profession attracts the individual who is, inherently, cautious and risk-averse. They are risk-averse by conditioning because law school and the profession itself promote risk-averseness. The cautious lawyer and the risk-averse legal profession produce an adverse societal effect – they preclude the use of the law as an innovative tool for social change.
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As an undergraduate, I worked in New Haven’s public schools as an elementary school tutor, nutrition program coordinator, and preschool volunteer. From those experiences, my interest in urban education policy was born and, being a native New Yorker and a product of its own city schools, I went on to write my senior essay on mayoral control of the NYC public school system. Since then, I’ve been hooked on education policy. During my senior year, I applied to be a teacher in NYC, hoping to start there and then go on to become NYC Schools Chancellor. At the same time, I’d always considered going to law school. I took the LSAT during my junior year and applied to law school soon after “just in case.” Then when it came to deciding which path I would take, I realize, in retrospect, that I chose the “safe” one. The path without the risk of failure and disappointment, but with the perceived guarantee of high-status and security.
 
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  • These generalizations are false. Some lawyers are risk averse and others aren't. You don't meet many risk loving lawyers in your law school class, and you don't know how to identify them when they pass through the law school to meet you, but that doesn't mean they don't exist. Your initial theme is correct in the subjunctive--were lawyers always risk averse, law would not be effective in making social change undesired by the ruling class. Fortunately, we don't live in the subjunctive.
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Not that teaching is, by any means, a “risky” profession. But the future that I envisioned was far from a sure-fire bet. And in the eyes of family and friends who had watched me “escape” from my middle-class upbringing to go on to Yale, becoming a teacher would be squandering a rare opportunity. If I wanted to be a teacher, they told me, I could have gone to the local community college and saved everyone a lot of money. They reminded me that my older sister and I were the first in my extended family to graduate from college. They spoke of material comfort and status and career satisfaction.
 
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My decision to go to law school wasn’t entirely influenced by the opinions of others. I too felt law school’s allure. Captivated by the perceived guarantee of high-status and eager to continue down a road that would earn me praise, law school seemed the obvious choice. The students I talked to at Admitted Students Day buttressed these beliefs. While many were unsure about their own futures, they were sure of one thing and were prone to repeating it: if you go to a top-tier law school, you get a job in a top-tier firm, regardless of mediocre academic achievement. The formula was flawless. The cautious, self-doubting, and afraid-to-fail person inside me was attracted to it. I tweaked my goals, telling myself that a legal degree would still allow me to pursue my education policy objectives.
 
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Risk-averse by nature

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Law school has seemed to further condition the risk-averse person inside me. Risk-averseness seems to be engrained in the curriculum and culture of law school. The 1L curriculum, one that has changed little over the years, consists of an array of common-law courses. The law is infrequently portrayed as a dynamic tool for social change. Judicial decisions are not analyzed with much attention paid to either context or aftermath. Rules and doctrine seem to be the focus, while policy and innovation are a mere afterthought, discussed after students extract the rules from the cases.
 
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Many individuals who go to law school tend to be, by nature, risk-averse. The legal profession offers a perceived guarantee of high-status and -income, and attracts individuals captivated by the seemingly risk-free path toward that end.
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From my perspective, risk-averseness seems to pervade the law school culture. The custom appears to be that 1Ls blindly follow what the older and wiser 2Ls tell them. If a 2L tells you to “submit your summer associate firm applications by December 1st or else,” you’d better do it. If a 2L tells you to buy the Chemerinsky treatise for Con Law, head to the nearest bookstore before you find yourself with a dreaded B minus. This risk-averseness is evident during exam time. Students who, in September were comforted by the prospect of that guaranteed “B,” now find themselves locked in the library for 15 hour days “just in case.”
 
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At the upper levels of the profession, risk-averseness might be especially pronounced. The prospective lawyers who are accepted to prestigious law schools are those with the most commendable resumes, and have thus grown accustomed to the praise that accompanies high achievement. Once enraptured by such praise, the individual will seek out those endeavors in which he is bound to triumph. The legal profession, with its guarantee of success and good fortune, is a common pick. The formula is oft-repeated by law school administrators and students themselves: if you go to a top-tier law school, you get a job in a top-tier firm. And this does not even require better-than-mediocre academic achievement. Thus, a scenario is created that the cautious, self-doubting, and afraid-to-fail prospective law student relishes and gravitates towards.
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Now, a year later, I find myself at an analogous crossroads. One road leads to an uncertain career and an unpredictable future in public-interest law and education policy or government work. The other leads to the quintessential Big Law Firm, with its seemingly “risk-free” path toward success. Once again, I hear the same voices and feel my risk-averse nature grabbing hold, except this time I feel a stronger urge to ignore them. I recognize the bifurcated pathway that law school and the legal profession have created and enforced – a dichotomy that amounts to a quasi-sorting system. Those willing to engage in the risk-taking and innovative work of pressing for social justice take one road, while those who are more risk-averse and timid head toward Big Law.
 
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  • But, because one wouldn't expect to look to the law firms that serve the business interests of the ruling class for the risk-taking work of pressing for social justice, your analysis actually points away from your conclusion, and towards a proposition with a very different valence. You are providing reason to believe that the ruling class is primarily served and defended by timid lawyers.
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The questions for me then become: how do we uproot this entrenched sorting system? How do we make both paths equally desirable, even to the most risk-averse individuals? Those who head to Big Law do so for a variety of reasons, but, I perceive, not always because they want to. Often, the path is chosen because it appears to be the safest, most attractive option. Those who make this choice often wind up using their license in ways they never intended: to serve the corporate ruling class. Many have big plans and ideas, most of which will never materialize – the combined result of their own risk-averse natures and the dichotomy created by law schools and the legal profession.
 
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Risk-averse by conditioning

The culture of law school and the substance of the legal profession reinforce these risk-averse tendencies. Risk-averseness is engrained in the law school curriculum and in the culture of law school. The 1L curriculum, one that has changed little over the years, consists of an array of common-law courses. Students are not taught how to use the law as a dynamic tool for social change and judicial decisions are analyzed without much attention to either context or to aftermath. Rules and doctrine are the focus. Policy and innovation seem to be afterthoughts, only discussed after students extract the rules from the cases.

Risk-averseness also pervades the law school culture. The custom seems to be that most 1Ls blindly follow what the older and wiser 2Ls tell them. If a 2L tells you to “submit your summer associate firm applications by December 1st or else,” you’d better do it. If a 2L tells you to buy the Chemerinsky treatise for Con Law, head to the nearest bookstore before you find yourself with a dreaded B minus. This risk-averseness is evident during exam time. Students who, in September were comforted by the prospect of that guaranteed “B,” now find themselves locked in the library for 15 hour days “just in case.”

The risk-averseness bred in law school then directs the prospective lawyer into those corners of the profession which offer the perceived guarantee of success and good fortune. Once nestled at their Big Law jobs, many lawyers eschew the prospect of using their license in ways that could uproot the comfy lifestyle that life at the large firm has created for them. At this point, caution is the name of the game and staying put seems to be the path most traveled.

The Social Effect of Risk-Averse Lawyers: How they are hurting society

Lawyers who are cautious by nature and risk-averse by conditioning are afraid to be innovative; few start their own firms or enter non-traditional legal fields. Many law students choose careers in Big Law which offer the prospect of material privilege, instead of pursuing more entrepreneurial, innovative, or public-interest minded careers that lack this guarantee. Many might choose this path because it is tried-and-true, and thus has obvious appeal to the cautious lawyer. In addition, because the culture of law school doesn’t prepare the lawyer for careers other than one in Big Law, the lawyer doesn’t know how to go about using the law in innovative ways. The road of law school seems to lead to only one destination. And to the risk-averse J.D., it is an alluring one.

Once nestled in his high-prestige position, the lawyer is further prevented from using the law in socially innovative ways. Now employed at the “Firm” and working for the “Partner,” the lawyer is cabined into certain practice areas and limited to certain clientele. These lawyers, now well-adapted to the comforts of material success, refuse to put their careers on the line to pursue an avenue that is more innovative and risky. As Veblen writes, the leisure class is marked by social conservatism, a feature that comes to be recognized as a mark of respectability, while innovation comes to be seen as improper, even “vulgar.” (199, 200). He says that because “the exigencies of the general economic situation of the community do not…directly impinge upon” the leisure class, that class becomes the barrier that retards “social evolution.” (198).

Conclusion

The risk-averseness that pervades both legal education and the profession at large creates non-entrepreneurial lawyers who don’t know how to use, or are discouraged from using, the law in innovative, socially-productive ways. The lure of guaranteed material success induces the cautious individual to go to law school. The culture of law school itself conditions the prospective lawyer to choose the most tried-and-true path, one that the cautious law student finds compelling. Once on this path, the lawyer disposes of his ability to use his license in socially innovative and productive ways. This cycle, effectively, reduces the law’s ability to effect dynamic change for the betterment of society.

 
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From where I’m standing now, I recognize the choice I have to make. I recognize that one side reflects a choice that has virtually already been made for me by family, society, the law school institution, and by the risk-averse person inside me. But I also know that there’s another side of me – a side that with the proper social and institutional support and personal courage can prevail.

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The Cautious Lawyer and the Risk-Averse Legal Profession

-- CaseyBoyle - 05 Apr 2008

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Lawyers are Risk-Averse both by Nature and by Conditioning

Lawyers are risk-averse both by nature and by conditioning. They are risk-averse by nature because the legal profession attracts the individual who is, inherently, cautious and risk-averse. They are risk-averse by conditioning because law school and the profession itself promote risk-averseness. The cautious lawyer and the risk-averse legal profession produce an adverse societal effect – they preclude the use of the law as an innovative tool for social change.

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Many lawyers are risk-averse. These lawyers are risk-averse by nature because the legal profession attracts the individual who is, inherently, cautious and risk-averse. They are risk-averse by conditioning because law school and the profession itself promote risk-averseness. The cautious lawyer and the risk-averse legal profession produce an adverse societal effect – they preclude the use of the law as an innovative tool for social change.
 
  • These generalizations are false. Some lawyers are risk averse and others aren't. You don't meet many risk loving lawyers in your law school class, and you don't know how to identify them when they pass through the law school to meet you, but that doesn't mean they don't exist. Your initial theme is correct in the subjunctive--were lawyers always risk averse, law would not be effective in making social change undesired by the ruling class. Fortunately, we don't live in the subjunctive.
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Risk-averse by nature

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People who go to law school tend to be, by nature, risk-averse. Because the legal profession offers a perceived guarantee of high-status and -income, the profession attracts individuals who are intent on this end and captivated by the seemingly risk-free path toward that end.

  • Some. But that's not all it attracts. Your "because" is plainly insufficient. You're setting up an argument about what must and what can't--conclusions which logically require premises quantified by "all" or "none." And such premises can't be shown on this subject. Some lawyers are corruptible time-servers and some lawyers are Sir Thomas More or Sir Matthew Hale. Sir Francis Bacon is both, and he's not the only one. People are complex. This "analysis" is merely simplistic.
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Many individuals who go to law school tend to be, by nature, risk-averse. The legal profession offers a perceived guarantee of high-status and -income, and attracts individuals captivated by the seemingly risk-free path toward that end.
 
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Thus, the law school applicant pool contains a surplus of individuals with cautious dispositions. At the upper levels of the profession, this cautious inclination is especially pronounced. The prospective lawyers who are accepted to prestigious law schools are those with the most commendable resumes, and have thus grown accustomed to the praise that accompanies high achievement. Once enraptured by such praise, the individual will seek out those endeavors in which he is bound to triumph. The legal profession, with its guarantee of success and good fortune, is a common pick. This formulaic guarantee is oft-repeated by law school administrators and the students themselves: if one goes to a top-tier law school, one gets a job in a top-tier firm. And this propitious result does not even require better-than-mediocre academic achievement. Thus, a scenario is created that the cautious, self-doubting, and afraid-to-fail prospective law student relishes and gravitates towards.
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At the upper levels of the profession, risk-averseness might be especially pronounced. The prospective lawyers who are accepted to prestigious law schools are those with the most commendable resumes, and have thus grown accustomed to the praise that accompanies high achievement. Once enraptured by such praise, the individual will seek out those endeavors in which he is bound to triumph. The legal profession, with its guarantee of success and good fortune, is a common pick. The formula is oft-repeated by law school administrators and students themselves: if you go to a top-tier law school, you get a job in a top-tier firm. And this does not even require better-than-mediocre academic achievement. Thus, a scenario is created that the cautious, self-doubting, and afraid-to-fail prospective law student relishes and gravitates towards.
 
  • But, because one wouldn't expect to look to the law firms that serve the business interests of the ruling class for the risk-taking work of pressing for social justice, your analysis actually points away from your conclusion, and towards a proposition with a very different valence. You are providing reason to believe that the ruling class is primarily served and defended by timid lawyers.
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As Veblen writes in The Theory of the Leisure Class, within every man is a “desire…to put [his] prowess in evidence by exhibiting some durable result of [his] exploits.” The game of pecuniary emulation is one of demonstrating power through possessions. This drive to accumulate wealth and possessions in order to “retain one’s good name” and to earn “popular esteem” helps explain the risk-averseness that inheres in the prospective lawyer. Given that the legal profession is perceived as offering a surefire prospect of material success, individuals who gravitate towards it are, in general, those who are most concerned with earning the “esteem” of their peers. Hence, many of the students filling the seats of top-tier law schools are interested in playing the pecuniary emulation game and playing it safely.
 

Risk-averse by conditioning

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The culture of law school and the substance of the legal profession reinforce these risk-averse tendencies. Risk-averseness is engrained in the law school curriculum and in the culture of law school. The 1L curriculum, one that has changed little over the years, consists of an array of common-law courses emphasizing history and tradition.

  • If you think history is a subject of study that breeds risk-aversion and conservatism in policy-making, you need to explain why. I don't think so, and I know a little history.

The law is depicted as a static force and a judicial decision is analyzed without much attention to either context or to aftermath. Rules and doctrine are the focus. Policy and innovation are afterthoughts (both in the casebooks and in the lesson).

  • The first part of the first sentence seems to me patently false, but perhaps you could demonstrate it if you didn't just assert it. I don't think the second and third sentences are true of my conservative colleagues who have a prevailingly economic view of the law's subject matter, let alone those who don't come from that background. But as you have not been through law school yet, perhaps with less extensive information you can see the subject more clearly than I do. It would be good to have the benefit of whatever evidence you do have. Even a little.

Risk-averseness also pervades the law school culture. The custom seems to be that 1Ls blindly follow what the older and wiser 2Ls tell them. If a 2L tells you to “submit your summer associate firm applications by December 1st or else,” you’d better do it. If a 2L tells you to buy the Chemerinsky treatise for Con Law, head to the nearest bookstore before you find yourself with a dreaded B minus. This risk-averseness is evident during exam time. Students who, in September were comforted by the prospect of that guaranteed “B,” now find themselves locked in the library for 15 hour days “just in case.”

  • This may be a statement from personal experience, but it can't possibly be uniform. Not only doesn't it describe what I was like in law school, or what my friends among my colleagues were like, it doesn't describe all the students I know now. So it might be more useful to focus on the differences between those whom it does and does not describe, than to imply it describes everyone or even most people.
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The culture of law school and the substance of the legal profession reinforce these risk-averse tendencies. Risk-averseness is engrained in the law school curriculum and in the culture of law school. The 1L curriculum, one that has changed little over the years, consists of an array of common-law courses. Students are not taught how to use the law as a dynamic tool for social change and judicial decisions are analyzed without much attention to either context or to aftermath. Rules and doctrine are the focus. Policy and innovation seem to be afterthoughts, only discussed after students extract the rules from the cases.
 
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This risk-averseness and caution follow the lawyer into the profession. Once there, the lawyer learns that his job is to help his clients minimize risk and liability, or help bail his client out when a risk has been actualized. At a firm, the job of the associate becomes to ensure that the partners are kept happy. The job of the partner is to ensure that the firm makes money. These respective mindsets increase the level of caution and diminish any innovative leeway. Furthermore, once situated within a well-paying and cushy job, lawyers become even more risk-averse for fear of losing their hard-earned status. Thus, associates continue to do what their partners want them to do, and partners continue to do whatever will help the firm’s bottom line.

  • This doesn't even describe all the lawyers I know in all the firms you think you're talking about, let alone all the other lawyers I know who don't work there. So maybe, once again, we should try to get away from the argument that this is the profession, to a consideration of the extent to which this is where some potentially valuable people unfortunately wind up.
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Risk-averseness also pervades the law school culture. The custom seems to be that most 1Ls blindly follow what the older and wiser 2Ls tell them. If a 2L tells you to “submit your summer associate firm applications by December 1st or else,” you’d better do it. If a 2L tells you to buy the Chemerinsky treatise for Con Law, head to the nearest bookstore before you find yourself with a dreaded B minus. This risk-averseness is evident during exam time. Students who, in September were comforted by the prospect of that guaranteed “B,” now find themselves locked in the library for 15 hour days “just in case.”
 
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The risk-averseness bred in law school then directs the prospective lawyer into those corners of the profession which offer the perceived guarantee of success and good fortune. Once nestled at their Big Law jobs, many lawyers eschew the prospect of using their license in ways that could uproot the comfy lifestyle that life at the large firm has created for them. At this point, caution is the name of the game and staying put seems to be the path most traveled.
 

The Social Effect of Risk-Averse Lawyers: How they are hurting society

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The lawyer’s cautious disposition and the profession’s discouragement of risk-taking have significant societal effects. While foresight, caution, and meticulousness are indeed valued qualities in a lawyer, these same traits prevent the law from being used in socially innovative ways.

  • Nonsense. I've been using law in socially innovative ways throughout a practice extending twenty years, and I have used foresight, caution and meticulousness, among other qualities, in order to make my risks, large as they were, pay off for me. Your antinomy between caution and risk would appall any military commander worth the cost of his ammunition and worthy of the lives entrusted to him, while the opposition of foresight to risk would make all leadership worthless.

Lawyers who are cautious by nature and risk-averse by conditioning are afraid to be innovative; few start their own firms or enter non-traditional legal fields.

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Lawyers who are cautious by nature and risk-averse by conditioning are afraid to be innovative; few start their own firms or enter non-traditional legal fields. Many law students choose careers in Big Law which offer the prospect of material privilege, instead of pursuing more entrepreneurial, innovative, or public-interest minded careers that lack this guarantee. Many might choose this path because it is tried-and-true, and thus has obvious appeal to the cautious lawyer. In addition, because the culture of law school doesn’t prepare the lawyer for careers other than one in Big Law, the lawyer doesn’t know how to go about using the law in innovative ways. The road of law school seems to lead to only one destination. And to the risk-averse J.D., it is an alluring one.
 
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A tautology and its consequence.

Many graduating law students choose careers in Big Law which offer the guaranteed prospect of material privilege, instead of pursuing more entrepreneurial, innovative, or public-interest minded careers that lack this guarantee. Many might choose this path not because they want to, but because it is what everyone does. It is a path that is tried-and-true, and thus has obvious appeal to the cautious lawyer. In addition, because the culture of law school doesn’t prepare the lawyer for careers other than one in Big Law, the lawyer doesn’t know how to go about using the law in innovative ways. The road of law school seems to lead to only one destination. And to the risk-averse J.D., it is an alluring one.

  • "Many people around here are conformists." Now you don't need the rest of the paragraph. This is how papers become too long. You are spelling out obvious consequences of ideas you haven't carefully scrutinized, headed for a conclusion that won't work for you, taking much too long to get there. Even when writing the first draft you should have felt the weariness of this work overcoming you, and moved to reconsider the plan that was bogging you down.

Once nestled in his high-prestige position, the lawyer is further prevented from using the law in socially innovative ways. Now employed at the “Firm” and working for the “Partner,” the lawyer is cabined into certain practice areas and limited to certain clientele. These lawyers, now well-adapted to the comforts of material success, refuse to put their careers on the line to pursue an avenue that is more innovative and risky. As Veblen writes, the leisure class is marked by social conservatism, a feature that comes to be recognized as a mark of respectability, while innovation comes to be seen as improper, even “vulgar.” (199, 200). He says that because “the exigencies of the general economic situation of the community do not…directly impinge upon” the leisure class, that class becomes the barrier that retards “social evolution.” (198). According to Veblen, the leisure class’s role “in social evolution is to retard the movement and to conserve what is obsolescent.” (198).

Another wasted paragraph, because the Veblen point can be made in a sentence. And it will only apply to some lawyers, leaving all the clearer the question ("what makes the difference?") that you should be writing about.

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Once nestled in his high-prestige position, the lawyer is further prevented from using the law in socially innovative ways. Now employed at the “Firm” and working for the “Partner,” the lawyer is cabined into certain practice areas and limited to certain clientele. These lawyers, now well-adapted to the comforts of material success, refuse to put their careers on the line to pursue an avenue that is more innovative and risky. As Veblen writes, the leisure class is marked by social conservatism, a feature that comes to be recognized as a mark of respectability, while innovation comes to be seen as improper, even “vulgar.” (199, 200). He says that because “the exigencies of the general economic situation of the community do not…directly impinge upon” the leisure class, that class becomes the barrier that retards “social evolution.” (198).
 

Conclusion


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The Cautious Lawyer and the Risk-Averse Legal Profession

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-- CaseyBoyle - 05 Apr 2008 (ready for comments)
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-- CaseyBoyle - 05 Apr 2008
 

Lawyers are Risk-Averse both by Nature and by Conditioning

Lawyers are risk-averse both by nature and by conditioning. They are risk-averse by nature because the legal profession attracts the individual who is, inherently, cautious and risk-averse. They are risk-averse by conditioning because law school and the profession itself promote risk-averseness. The cautious lawyer and the risk-averse legal profession produce an adverse societal effect – they preclude the use of the law as an innovative tool for social change.

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  • These generalizations are false. Some lawyers are risk averse and others aren't. You don't meet many risk loving lawyers in your law school class, and you don't know how to identify them when they pass through the law school to meet you, but that doesn't mean they don't exist. Your initial theme is correct in the subjunctive--were lawyers always risk averse, law would not be effective in making social change undesired by the ruling class. Fortunately, we don't live in the subjunctive.

 

Risk-averse by nature

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People who go to law school tend to be, by nature, risk-averse. Because the legal profession offers a perceived guarantee of high-status and -income, the profession attracts individuals who are intent on this end and captivated by the seemingly risk-free path toward that end. Thus, the law school applicant pool contains a surplus of individuals with cautious dispositions. At the upper levels of the profession, this cautious inclination is especially pronounced. The prospective lawyers who are accepted to prestigious law schools are those with the most commendable resumes, and have thus grown accustomed to the praise that accompanies high achievement. Once enraptured by such praise, the individual will seek out those endeavors in which he is bound to triumph. The legal profession, with its guarantee of success and good fortune, is a common pick. This formulaic guarantee is oft-repeated by law school administrators and the students themselves: if one goes to a top-tier law school, one gets a job in a top-tier firm. And this propitious result does not even require better-than-mediocre academic achievement. Thus, a scenario is created that the cautious, self-doubting, and afraid-to-fail prospective law student relishes and gravitates towards.
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People who go to law school tend to be, by nature, risk-averse. Because the legal profession offers a perceived guarantee of high-status and -income, the profession attracts individuals who are intent on this end and captivated by the seemingly risk-free path toward that end.

  • Some. But that's not all it attracts. Your "because" is plainly insufficient. You're setting up an argument about what must and what can't--conclusions which logically require premises quantified by "all" or "none." And such premises can't be shown on this subject. Some lawyers are corruptible time-servers and some lawyers are Sir Thomas More or Sir Matthew Hale. Sir Francis Bacon is both, and he's not the only one. People are complex. This "analysis" is merely simplistic.

Thus, the law school applicant pool contains a surplus of individuals with cautious dispositions. At the upper levels of the profession, this cautious inclination is especially pronounced. The prospective lawyers who are accepted to prestigious law schools are those with the most commendable resumes, and have thus grown accustomed to the praise that accompanies high achievement. Once enraptured by such praise, the individual will seek out those endeavors in which he is bound to triumph. The legal profession, with its guarantee of success and good fortune, is a common pick. This formulaic guarantee is oft-repeated by law school administrators and the students themselves: if one goes to a top-tier law school, one gets a job in a top-tier firm. And this propitious result does not even require better-than-mediocre academic achievement. Thus, a scenario is created that the cautious, self-doubting, and afraid-to-fail prospective law student relishes and gravitates towards.

  • But, because one wouldn't expect to look to the law firms that serve the business interests of the ruling class for the risk-taking work of pressing for social justice, your analysis actually points away from your conclusion, and towards a proposition with a very different valence. You are providing reason to believe that the ruling class is primarily served and defended by timid lawyers.
 As Veblen writes in The Theory of the Leisure Class, within every man is a “desire…to put [his] prowess in evidence by exhibiting some durable result of [his] exploits.” The game of pecuniary emulation is one of demonstrating power through possessions. This drive to accumulate wealth and possessions in order to “retain one’s good name” and to earn “popular esteem” helps explain the risk-averseness that inheres in the prospective lawyer. Given that the legal profession is perceived as offering a surefire prospect of material success, individuals who gravitate towards it are, in general, those who are most concerned with earning the “esteem” of their peers. Hence, many of the students filling the seats of top-tier law schools are interested in playing the pecuniary emulation game and playing it safely.

Risk-averse by conditioning

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The culture of law school and the substance of the legal profession reinforce these risk-averse tendencies. Risk-averseness is engrained in the law school curriculum and in the culture of law school. The 1L curriculum, one that has changed little over the years, consists of an array of common-law courses emphasizing history and tradition. The law is depicted as a static force and a judicial decision is analyzed without much attention to either context or to aftermath. Rules and doctrine are the focus. Policy and innovation are afterthoughts (both in the casebooks and in the lesson).
>
>
The culture of law school and the substance of the legal profession reinforce these risk-averse tendencies. Risk-averseness is engrained in the law school curriculum and in the culture of law school. The 1L curriculum, one that has changed little over the years, consists of an array of common-law courses emphasizing history and tradition.

  • If you think history is a subject of study that breeds risk-aversion and conservatism in policy-making, you need to explain why. I don't think so, and I know a little history.

The law is depicted as a static force and a judicial decision is analyzed without much attention to either context or to aftermath. Rules and doctrine are the focus. Policy and innovation are afterthoughts (both in the casebooks and in the lesson).

  • The first part of the first sentence seems to me patently false, but perhaps you could demonstrate it if you didn't just assert it. I don't think the second and third sentences are true of my conservative colleagues who have a prevailingly economic view of the law's subject matter, let alone those who don't come from that background. But as you have not been through law school yet, perhaps with less extensive information you can see the subject more clearly than I do. It would be good to have the benefit of whatever evidence you do have. Even a little.
 Risk-averseness also pervades the law school culture. The custom seems to be that 1Ls blindly follow what the older and wiser 2Ls tell them. If a 2L tells you to “submit your summer associate firm applications by December 1st or else,” you’d better do it. If a 2L tells you to buy the Chemerinsky treatise for Con Law, head to the nearest bookstore before you find yourself with a dreaded B minus. This risk-averseness is evident during exam time. Students who, in September were comforted by the prospect of that guaranteed “B,” now find themselves locked in the library for 15 hour days “just in case.”
Added:
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>
  • This may be a statement from personal experience, but it can't possibly be uniform. Not only doesn't it describe what I was like in law school, or what my friends among my colleagues were like, it doesn't describe all the students I know now. So it might be more useful to focus on the differences between those whom it does and does not describe, than to imply it describes everyone or even most people.

 This risk-averseness and caution follow the lawyer into the profession. Once there, the lawyer learns that his job is to help his clients minimize risk and liability, or help bail his client out when a risk has been actualized. At a firm, the job of the associate becomes to ensure that the partners are kept happy. The job of the partner is to ensure that the firm makes money. These respective mindsets increase the level of caution and diminish any innovative leeway. Furthermore, once situated within a well-paying and cushy job, lawyers become even more risk-averse for fear of losing their hard-earned status. Thus, associates continue to do what their partners want them to do, and partners continue to do whatever will help the firm’s bottom line.
Added:
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  • This doesn't even describe all the lawyers I know in all the firms you think you're talking about, let alone all the other lawyers I know who don't work there. So maybe, once again, we should try to get away from the argument that this is the profession, to a consideration of the extent to which this is where some potentially valuable people unfortunately wind up.

 

The Social Effect of Risk-Averse Lawyers: How they are hurting society

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The lawyer’s cautious disposition and the profession’s discouragement of risk-taking have significant societal effects. While foresight, caution, and meticulousness are indeed valued qualities in a lawyer, these same traits prevent the law from being used in socially innovative ways. Lawyers who are cautious by nature and risk-averse by conditioning are afraid to be innovative; few start their own firms or enter non-traditional legal fields. Many graduating law students choose careers in Big Law which offer the guaranteed prospect of material privilege, instead of pursuing more entrepreneurial, innovative, or public-interest minded careers that lack this guarantee. Many might choose this path not because they want to, but because it is what everyone does. It is a path that is tried-and-true, and thus has obvious appeal to the cautious lawyer. In addition, because the culture of law school doesn’t prepare the lawyer for careers other than one in Big Law, the lawyer doesn’t know how to go about using the law in innovative ways. The road of law school seems to lead to only one destination. And to the risk-averse J.D., it is an alluring one.
>
>
The lawyer’s cautious disposition and the profession’s discouragement of risk-taking have significant societal effects. While foresight, caution, and meticulousness are indeed valued qualities in a lawyer, these same traits prevent the law from being used in socially innovative ways.

  • Nonsense. I've been using law in socially innovative ways throughout a practice extending twenty years, and I have used foresight, caution and meticulousness, among other qualities, in order to make my risks, large as they were, pay off for me. Your antinomy between caution and risk would appall any military commander worth the cost of his ammunition and worthy of the lives entrusted to him, while the opposition of foresight to risk would make all leadership worthless.

Lawyers who are cautious by nature and risk-averse by conditioning are afraid to be innovative; few start their own firms or enter non-traditional legal fields.

A tautology and its consequence.

Many graduating law students choose careers in Big Law which offer the guaranteed prospect of material privilege, instead of pursuing more entrepreneurial, innovative, or public-interest minded careers that lack this guarantee. Many might choose this path not because they want to, but because it is what everyone does. It is a path that is tried-and-true, and thus has obvious appeal to the cautious lawyer. In addition, because the culture of law school doesn’t prepare the lawyer for careers other than one in Big Law, the lawyer doesn’t know how to go about using the law in innovative ways. The road of law school seems to lead to only one destination. And to the risk-averse J.D., it is an alluring one.

  • "Many people around here are conformists." Now you don't need the rest of the paragraph. This is how papers become too long. You are spelling out obvious consequences of ideas you haven't carefully scrutinized, headed for a conclusion that won't work for you, taking much too long to get there. Even when writing the first draft you should have felt the weariness of this work overcoming you, and moved to reconsider the plan that was bogging you down.
 Once nestled in his high-prestige position, the lawyer is further prevented from using the law in socially innovative ways. Now employed at the “Firm” and working for the “Partner,” the lawyer is cabined into certain practice areas and limited to certain clientele. These lawyers, now well-adapted to the comforts of material success, refuse to put their careers on the line to pursue an avenue that is more innovative and risky. As Veblen writes, the leisure class is marked by social conservatism, a feature that comes to be recognized as a mark of respectability, while innovation comes to be seen as improper, even “vulgar.” (199, 200). He says that because “the exigencies of the general economic situation of the community do not…directly impinge upon” the leisure class, that class becomes the barrier that retards “social evolution.” (198). According to Veblen, the leisure class’s role “in social evolution is to retard the movement and to conserve what is obsolescent.” (198).
Added:
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Another wasted paragraph, because the Veblen point can be made in a sentence. And it will only apply to some lawyers, leaving all the clearer the question ("what makes the difference?") that you should be writing about.
 

Conclusion

The risk-averseness that pervades both legal education and the profession at large creates non-entrepreneurial lawyers who don’t know how to use, or are discouraged from using, the law in innovative, socially-productive ways. The lure of guaranteed material success induces the cautious individual to go to law school. The culture of law school itself conditions the prospective lawyer to choose the most tried-and-true path, one that the cautious law student finds compelling. Once on this path, the lawyer disposes of his ability to use his license in socially innovative and productive ways. This cycle, effectively, reduces the law’s ability to effect dynamic change for the betterment of society.


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The Cautious Lawyer and the Risk-Averse Legal Profession

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-- CaseyBoyle - 05 Apr 2008 (ready for comments)
 

Lawyers are Risk-Averse both by Nature and by Conditioning

Lawyers are risk-averse both by nature and by conditioning. They are risk-averse by nature because the legal profession attracts the individual who is, inherently, cautious and risk-averse. They are risk-averse by conditioning because law school and the profession itself promote risk-averseness. The cautious lawyer and the risk-averse legal profession produce an adverse societal effect – they preclude the use of the law as an innovative tool for social change.

Risk-averse by nature

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People who go to law school tend to be, by nature, risk-averse. Because the legal profession offers a perceived guarantee of high-status and -income, the profession attracts individuals who are intent on this end and captivated by the seemingly risk-free path toward that end. Thus, the law school applicant pool contains a surplus of individuals with cautious dispositions. At the upper levels of the profession, this cautious inclination might be especially pronounced. The prospective lawyers who are accepted to prestigious law schools are those with the most commendable resumes, and have thus grown accustomed to the praise that accompanies high achievement. Once enraptured by such praise, the individual will seek out those endeavors in which he is bound to triumph. The legal profession, with its guarantee of success and good fortune, is a common pick. This formulaic guarantee is oft-repeated by law school administrators and the students themselves: if one goes to a top-tier law school, one gets a job in a top-tier firm. And this propitious result does not even require better-than-mediocre academic achievement. Thus, a scenario is created that the cautious, self-doubting, and afraid-to-fail prospective law student relishes and gravitates towards.
>
>
People who go to law school tend to be, by nature, risk-averse. Because the legal profession offers a perceived guarantee of high-status and -income, the profession attracts individuals who are intent on this end and captivated by the seemingly risk-free path toward that end. Thus, the law school applicant pool contains a surplus of individuals with cautious dispositions. At the upper levels of the profession, this cautious inclination is especially pronounced. The prospective lawyers who are accepted to prestigious law schools are those with the most commendable resumes, and have thus grown accustomed to the praise that accompanies high achievement. Once enraptured by such praise, the individual will seek out those endeavors in which he is bound to triumph. The legal profession, with its guarantee of success and good fortune, is a common pick. This formulaic guarantee is oft-repeated by law school administrators and the students themselves: if one goes to a top-tier law school, one gets a job in a top-tier firm. And this propitious result does not even require better-than-mediocre academic achievement. Thus, a scenario is created that the cautious, self-doubting, and afraid-to-fail prospective law student relishes and gravitates towards.
 
Changed:
<
<
As Veblen emphasizes in The Theory of the Leisure Class, within every man is a “desire…to put [his] prowess in evidence by exhibiting some durable result of [his] exploits.” The game of pecuniary emulation is one of demonstrating power through possessions. This drive to accumulate wealth and possessions in order to “retain one’s good name” and to earn “popular esteem” helps explain the risk-averseness that inheres in the prospective lawyer. Given that the legal profession is perceived as offering a surefire prospect of material success, individuals who gravitate towards it are, in general, those who are most concerned with earning the “esteem” of their peers. Hence, many of the students filling the seats of top-tier law schools are interested in playing the pecuniary emulation game and playing it safely. The prospective lawyer at the fancy law school finds himself faced with a good set of odds: the certainty of an esteem-earning license and the prospect of material success.
>
>
As Veblen writes in The Theory of the Leisure Class, within every man is a “desire…to put [his] prowess in evidence by exhibiting some durable result of [his] exploits.” The game of pecuniary emulation is one of demonstrating power through possessions. This drive to accumulate wealth and possessions in order to “retain one’s good name” and to earn “popular esteem” helps explain the risk-averseness that inheres in the prospective lawyer. Given that the legal profession is perceived as offering a surefire prospect of material success, individuals who gravitate towards it are, in general, those who are most concerned with earning the “esteem” of their peers. Hence, many of the students filling the seats of top-tier law schools are interested in playing the pecuniary emulation game and playing it safely.
 

Risk-averse by conditioning

Line: 24 to 26
 The lawyer’s cautious disposition and the profession’s discouragement of risk-taking have significant societal effects. While foresight, caution, and meticulousness are indeed valued qualities in a lawyer, these same traits prevent the law from being used in socially innovative ways. Lawyers who are cautious by nature and risk-averse by conditioning are afraid to be innovative; few start their own firms or enter non-traditional legal fields. Many graduating law students choose careers in Big Law which offer the guaranteed prospect of material privilege, instead of pursuing more entrepreneurial, innovative, or public-interest minded careers that lack this guarantee. Many might choose this path not because they want to, but because it is what everyone does. It is a path that is tried-and-true, and thus has obvious appeal to the cautious lawyer. In addition, because the culture of law school doesn’t prepare the lawyer for careers other than one in Big Law, the lawyer doesn’t know how to go about using the law in innovative ways. The road of law school seems to lead to only one destination. And to the risk-averse J.D., it is an alluring one.
Changed:
<
<
Once nestled in his high-prestige position, the lawyer is further prevented from using the law in socially innovative ways. Now employed at the “Firm” and working for the “Partner,” the lawyer is cabined into certain practice areas and limited to certain clientele. These lawyers, now well-adapted to the comforts of material success, refuse to put their careers on the line to pursue an avenue that is more innovative and risky. Instead, they choose to continue doing what works, which is, effectively, what the Firm tells them to do. As Veblen writes, the leisure class is marked by social conservatism, a feature that comes to be recognized as a mark of respectability, while innovation comes to be seen as improper, even “vulgar.” (199, 200). He says that because “the exigencies of the general economic situation of the community do not…directly impinge upon” the leisure class, that class becomes the barrier that retards “social evolution.” (198). According to Veblen, the leisure class’s role “in social evolution is to retard the movement and to conserve what is obsolescent.” (198). The leisure class’s conservatism is infectious, because that class impedes development “through its prescriptive example of conspicuous waste and of conservatism.” (205).
>
>
Once nestled in his high-prestige position, the lawyer is further prevented from using the law in socially innovative ways. Now employed at the “Firm” and working for the “Partner,” the lawyer is cabined into certain practice areas and limited to certain clientele. These lawyers, now well-adapted to the comforts of material success, refuse to put their careers on the line to pursue an avenue that is more innovative and risky. As Veblen writes, the leisure class is marked by social conservatism, a feature that comes to be recognized as a mark of respectability, while innovation comes to be seen as improper, even “vulgar.” (199, 200). He says that because “the exigencies of the general economic situation of the community do not…directly impinge upon” the leisure class, that class becomes the barrier that retards “social evolution.” (198). According to Veblen, the leisure class’s role “in social evolution is to retard the movement and to conserve what is obsolescent.” (198).
 

Conclusion

The risk-averseness that pervades both legal education and the profession at large creates non-entrepreneurial lawyers who don’t know how to use, or are discouraged from using, the law in innovative, socially-productive ways. The lure of guaranteed material success induces the cautious individual to go to law school. The culture of law school itself conditions the prospective lawyer to choose the most tried-and-true path, one that the cautious law student finds compelling. Once on this path, the lawyer disposes of his ability to use his license in socially innovative and productive ways. This cycle, effectively, reduces the law’s ability to effect dynamic change for the betterment of society.

Deleted:
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-- CaseyBoyle - 01 Apr 2008
 
 
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CaseyBoyle-SecondPaper 2 - 04 Apr 2008 - Main.CaseyBoyle
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META TOPICPARENT name="WebPreferences"

The Cautious Lawyer and the Risk-Averse Legal Profession

Lawyers are Risk-Averse both by Nature and by Conditioning

Added:
>
>
Lawyers are risk-averse both by nature and by conditioning. They are risk-averse by nature because the legal profession attracts the individual who is, inherently, cautious and risk-averse. They are risk-averse by conditioning because law school and the profession itself promote risk-averseness. The cautious lawyer and the risk-averse legal profession produce an adverse societal effect – they preclude the use of the law as an innovative tool for social change.
 

Risk-averse by nature

Added:
>
>
People who go to law school tend to be, by nature, risk-averse. Because the legal profession offers a perceived guarantee of high-status and -income, the profession attracts individuals who are intent on this end and captivated by the seemingly risk-free path toward that end. Thus, the law school applicant pool contains a surplus of individuals with cautious dispositions. At the upper levels of the profession, this cautious inclination might be especially pronounced. The prospective lawyers who are accepted to prestigious law schools are those with the most commendable resumes, and have thus grown accustomed to the praise that accompanies high achievement. Once enraptured by such praise, the individual will seek out those endeavors in which he is bound to triumph. The legal profession, with its guarantee of success and good fortune, is a common pick. This formulaic guarantee is oft-repeated by law school administrators and the students themselves: if one goes to a top-tier law school, one gets a job in a top-tier firm. And this propitious result does not even require better-than-mediocre academic achievement. Thus, a scenario is created that the cautious, self-doubting, and afraid-to-fail prospective law student relishes and gravitates towards.

As Veblen emphasizes in The Theory of the Leisure Class, within every man is a “desire…to put [his] prowess in evidence by exhibiting some durable result of [his] exploits.” The game of pecuniary emulation is one of demonstrating power through possessions. This drive to accumulate wealth and possessions in order to “retain one’s good name” and to earn “popular esteem” helps explain the risk-averseness that inheres in the prospective lawyer. Given that the legal profession is perceived as offering a surefire prospect of material success, individuals who gravitate towards it are, in general, those who are most concerned with earning the “esteem” of their peers. Hence, many of the students filling the seats of top-tier law schools are interested in playing the pecuniary emulation game and playing it safely. The prospective lawyer at the fancy law school finds himself faced with a good set of odds: the certainty of an esteem-earning license and the prospect of material success.

 

Risk-averse by conditioning

Added:
>
>
The culture of law school and the substance of the legal profession reinforce these risk-averse tendencies. Risk-averseness is engrained in the law school curriculum and in the culture of law school. The 1L curriculum, one that has changed little over the years, consists of an array of common-law courses emphasizing history and tradition. The law is depicted as a static force and a judicial decision is analyzed without much attention to either context or to aftermath. Rules and doctrine are the focus. Policy and innovation are afterthoughts (both in the casebooks and in the lesson).

Risk-averseness also pervades the law school culture. The custom seems to be that 1Ls blindly follow what the older and wiser 2Ls tell them. If a 2L tells you to “submit your summer associate firm applications by December 1st or else,” you’d better do it. If a 2L tells you to buy the Chemerinsky treatise for Con Law, head to the nearest bookstore before you find yourself with a dreaded B minus. This risk-averseness is evident during exam time. Students who, in September were comforted by the prospect of that guaranteed “B,” now find themselves locked in the library for 15 hour days “just in case.”

This risk-averseness and caution follow the lawyer into the profession. Once there, the lawyer learns that his job is to help his clients minimize risk and liability, or help bail his client out when a risk has been actualized. At a firm, the job of the associate becomes to ensure that the partners are kept happy. The job of the partner is to ensure that the firm makes money. These respective mindsets increase the level of caution and diminish any innovative leeway. Furthermore, once situated within a well-paying and cushy job, lawyers become even more risk-averse for fear of losing their hard-earned status. Thus, associates continue to do what their partners want them to do, and partners continue to do whatever will help the firm’s bottom line.

 

The Social Effect of Risk-Averse Lawyers: How they are hurting society

Added:
>
>
The lawyer’s cautious disposition and the profession’s discouragement of risk-taking have significant societal effects. While foresight, caution, and meticulousness are indeed valued qualities in a lawyer, these same traits prevent the law from being used in socially innovative ways. Lawyers who are cautious by nature and risk-averse by conditioning are afraid to be innovative; few start their own firms or enter non-traditional legal fields. Many graduating law students choose careers in Big Law which offer the guaranteed prospect of material privilege, instead of pursuing more entrepreneurial, innovative, or public-interest minded careers that lack this guarantee. Many might choose this path not because they want to, but because it is what everyone does. It is a path that is tried-and-true, and thus has obvious appeal to the cautious lawyer. In addition, because the culture of law school doesn’t prepare the lawyer for careers other than one in Big Law, the lawyer doesn’t know how to go about using the law in innovative ways. The road of law school seems to lead to only one destination. And to the risk-averse J.D., it is an alluring one.

Once nestled in his high-prestige position, the lawyer is further prevented from using the law in socially innovative ways. Now employed at the “Firm” and working for the “Partner,” the lawyer is cabined into certain practice areas and limited to certain clientele. These lawyers, now well-adapted to the comforts of material success, refuse to put their careers on the line to pursue an avenue that is more innovative and risky. Instead, they choose to continue doing what works, which is, effectively, what the Firm tells them to do. As Veblen writes, the leisure class is marked by social conservatism, a feature that comes to be recognized as a mark of respectability, while innovation comes to be seen as improper, even “vulgar.” (199, 200). He says that because “the exigencies of the general economic situation of the community do not…directly impinge upon” the leisure class, that class becomes the barrier that retards “social evolution.” (198). According to Veblen, the leisure class’s role “in social evolution is to retard the movement and to conserve what is obsolescent.” (198). The leisure class’s conservatism is infectious, because that class impedes development “through its prescriptive example of conspicuous waste and of conservatism.” (205).

Conclusion

The risk-averseness that pervades both legal education and the profession at large creates non-entrepreneurial lawyers who don’t know how to use, or are discouraged from using, the law in innovative, socially-productive ways. The lure of guaranteed material success induces the cautious individual to go to law school. The culture of law school itself conditions the prospective lawyer to choose the most tried-and-true path, one that the cautious law student finds compelling. Once on this path, the lawyer disposes of his ability to use his license in socially innovative and productive ways. This cycle, effectively, reduces the law’s ability to effect dynamic change for the betterment of society.

 

-- CaseyBoyle - 01 Apr 2008


CaseyBoyle-SecondPaper 1 - 01 Apr 2008 - Main.CaseyBoyle
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Added:
>
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META TOPICPARENT name="WebPreferences"

The Cautious Lawyer and the Risk-Averse Legal Profession

Lawyers are Risk-Averse both by Nature and by Conditioning

Risk-averse by nature

Risk-averse by conditioning

The Social Effect of Risk-Averse Lawyers: How they are hurting society

-- CaseyBoyle - 01 Apr 2008

 
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