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ChristopherWildsSecondPaper 3 - 08 Jul 2013 - Main.EbenMoglen
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< | NEGATIVE INCENTIVES INVOLVED IN GOVERNMENT SPONSORED "SNITCHING" Second Draft | >
> | NEGATIVE INCENTIVES INVOLVED IN GOVERNMENT SPONSORED "SNITCHING" | | | INTRO | |
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< | I am much more concerned about the loss of life to drugs and to the crime that's going on out there and the need to stop it and protect our innocents and our citizens than I am about anybody's concern over informants. Good Lord. Informants are the way of life in American justice, whether it's a drug issue or not. It's part of our judicial system. It's a good system, if it's run properly.
- Rep. Bill McCollum? (Republican Congressman from Florida's Fifth District. He is Chairman of the House Crime Subcommittee) | >
> | I am much more concerned about the loss of life to drugs and to the crime that's going on out there and the need to stop it and protect our innocents and our citizens than I am about anybody's concern over informants. Good Lord. Informants are the way of life in American justice, whether it's a drug issue or not. It's part of our judicial system. It's a good system, if it's run properly.
Rep. Bill McCollum (Republican Congressman from Florida's Fifth District. He is
Chairman of the Crime Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee
)
McCollum hasn't been
in Congress since 2000. He holds no elective office, having last
been defeated by Mel Martinez in the Florida Republican Senate
Primary in 2010. Who cares what he said once?
What if the system isn’t run properly? What if there is very poor oversight of informants?
One doesn't "oversee"
informants. One uses them. The purpose of informants is to produce
information, not evidence.
What if there are tremendous incentives and pressures that cause both criminals, as well as law enforcement personnel to exploit the system for their own personal benefit?
Of course there are.
How could there not be? How could a system exist in which both
cops and robbers didn't need one another, and in which the commerce
in information didn't exist? | | | | |
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< | What if the system isn’t run properly? What if there is very poor oversight of informants? What if there are tremendous incentives and pressures that cause both criminals, as well as law enforcement personnel to exploit the system for their own personal benefit? | | | In many instances, informants in criminal cases don’t offer law enforcement personnel information against other criminals out of the goodness of their own hearts. Rather, they strike deals with law enforcement to provide information about other criminals, usually in return for reduced prison sentences. They offer substantial information as “credible sources” to aid authorities in the arrest and conviction of others. Ironically, the same individuals whom the federal government doesn’t believe are telling the truth about their own criminal activities are set forth as valuable, trustworthy sources in stories regarding other people’s criminal activities. The negative incentives flow both ways. Criminals are given an incentive to make up information regarding others for their own personal gain and law enforcement officials have the incentive to use these “trustworthy” sources to bolster their cases against other individuals and keep conviction rates high. | |
>
> |
So?
| | | INCENTIVES FOR CRIMINALS
The federal informant procedures in place currently create incentives for criminals to provide information to law enforcement under false pretenses. In this system, “information” that can lead to an arrest becomes a commodity, to be traded with law enforcement for reduced sentences or to be sold to other criminals to be used as bargaining chips with the federal government. (For a an illustration of this marketplace in action See Snitch Market Illustration | |
>
> |
Information is not evidence, and no one supposes that it is.
| | | Some informants are even allowed to stay on the streets (in many cases committing crimes with a certain level of impunity) merely because they are willing to give up information on competitors and other criminals. Communities suffer when law enforcement tolerates crimes committed by cooperating offenders, whether it is drug use, property crimes, or violence. Criminals that are willing to give up information on others are compelled to store information on others (or fabricate it) and hold on to that information to use whenever they are caught breaking the law. Does this system seem like a good idea for stopping crime? | |
>
> |
It seems like the way information is gained in all forms of social conflict. So what?
| | | Proponents for the use of informants like to think of the system as a way to get greater numbers and a greater caliber of criminal off of the street. However, this perception assumes that all of the information obtained from these informants is true. Imagine a person in prison convicted of selling drugs. If this person has knowledge of another individual who sells drugs he may alert authorities and make a deal to cooperate in the investigation of that individual. Although the prisoner may have never interacted with the target of the police investigation, the prisoner has every incentive to take the stand as a witness and testify to being involved in illegal operations with the targeted individual and prosecutors have every incentive to allow that testimony to go forward.
“Who cares? They are criminals anyway! They chose to be involved in criminal activity so they should be aware that there is no honor amongst thieves.” Such a “make your bed now lay in it” attitude may seem fit for the situation of criminals testifying against criminals for reduced sentences. However, that feeling seems to assume the guilt of criminals before they have been tried in court. The real problem comes from the judicial system playing a role in a market as unethical as the one that exists between prosecutors and many informants. Surely if there is no honor amongst thieves, there must be some remnant of it within the criminal justice system.
If all information received by informants was painstakingly and precisely verified then it would be a much improved system (perhaps still not perfect). Unfortunately out system is not so fine-tuned and to just ignore such a violation of people’s security and freedom is extremely unjust. | |
>
> | Information is evidence
when submitted in proceedings along with other evidence. Informants
are witnesses when they testify and are subject to
cross-examination. No information contributes to convictions that
isn't submitted as evidence and subjected to critical scrutiny by
adversaries, judges and jurors. So what exactly is your complaint?
| | | INCENTIVES FOR PROSECUTORS
Prosecutors also become entangled in this system of injustice. For example, an ambitious prosecutor may be compelled to strike a deal with a dangerous criminal in order to secure the conviction of another more high-profile defendant. This system allows for a deal to be struck with a person who admits to nineteen murders, in order to secure the conviction of a “big fish”. See Gravano & Gotti | | | No criminal punishment system is perfect. Even still, to turn a blind eye to the injustice that is prevalent in the criminal justice system’s use of informants is disgraceful. To say that using these informants “gets the job done” is to say that individuals are not truly innocent before proven guilty. | |
>
> |
All witnesses have personal motives, biases and axes to grind. So?
| | | -- ChristopherWilds - 09 Apr 2013 |
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ChristopherWildsSecondPaper 2 - 21 Jun 2013 - Main.ChristopherWilds
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< | NEGATIVE INCENTIVES INVOLVED IN GOVERNMENT SPONSORED "SNITCHING" | >
> | NEGATIVE INCENTIVES INVOLVED IN GOVERNMENT SPONSORED "SNITCHING" Second Draft | | | INTRO
I am much more concerned about the loss of life to drugs and to the crime that's going on out there and the need to stop it and protect our innocents and our citizens than I am about anybody's concern over informants. Good Lord. Informants are the way of life in American justice, whether it's a drug issue or not. It's part of our judicial system. It's a good system, if it's run properly.
- Rep. Bill McCollum? (Republican Congressman from Florida's Fifth District. He is Chairman of the House Crime Subcommittee)
What if the system isn’t run properly? What if there is very poor oversight of informants? What if there are tremendous incentives and pressures that cause both criminals, as well as law enforcement personnel to exploit the system for their own personal benefit? | |
<
< | In many instances, informants in criminal cases don’t offer law enforcement personnel information against other criminals out of the goodness of their own hearts. Rather, they strike deals with law enforcement to provide information about other criminals, usually in return for reduced prison sentences. They offer substantial information as “credible sources” to aid authorities in the arrest and conviction of others. Ironically, the same individuals whom the federal government doesn’t believe are telling the truth about their own criminal activities are set forth as valuable, trustworthy sources in their stories regarding other people’s criminal activities. The negative incentives flow both ways. Criminals are given an incentive to make up information regarding others for their own personal gain and law enforcement officials have the incentive to use these “trustworthy” sources to bolster their cases against other individuals and keep conviction rates high. | >
> | In many instances, informants in criminal cases don’t offer law enforcement personnel information against other criminals out of the goodness of their own hearts. Rather, they strike deals with law enforcement to provide information about other criminals, usually in return for reduced prison sentences. They offer substantial information as “credible sources” to aid authorities in the arrest and conviction of others. Ironically, the same individuals whom the federal government doesn’t believe are telling the truth about their own criminal activities are set forth as valuable, trustworthy sources in stories regarding other people’s criminal activities. The negative incentives flow both ways. Criminals are given an incentive to make up information regarding others for their own personal gain and law enforcement officials have the incentive to use these “trustworthy” sources to bolster their cases against other individuals and keep conviction rates high. | | | INCENTIVES FOR CRIMINALS
The federal informant procedures in place currently create incentives for criminals to provide information to law enforcement under false pretenses. In this system, “information” that can lead to an arrest becomes a commodity, to be traded with law enforcement for reduced sentences or to be sold to other criminals to be used as bargaining chips with the federal government. (For a an illustration of this marketplace in action See Snitch Market Illustration
Some informants are even allowed to stay on the streets (in many cases committing crimes with a certain level of impunity) merely because they are willing to give up information on competitors and other criminals. Communities suffer when law enforcement tolerates crimes committed by cooperating offenders, whether it is drug use, property crimes, or violence. Criminals that are willing to give up information on others are compelled to store information on others (or fabricate it) and hold on to that information to use whenever they are caught breaking the law. Does this system seem like a good idea for stopping crime? | |
<
< | Proponents for the use of informants like to think of the system as a way to get greater numbers and greater calibers of criminals off of the street. However, this perception assumes that all of the information obtained from these informants is true. Imagine a person in prison convicted of selling drugs. If this person has knowledge of another individual who sells drugs he may alert authorities and make a deal to cooperate in the investigation of that individual. Although the prisoner may have never interacted with the target of the police investigation, the prisoner has every incentive to take the stand as a witness and testify to being involved in illegal operations with that individual and prosecutors have every incentive to allow that testimony to go forward.
If our criminal justice system was perfect and precisely verified all information received by informants then it would be a much improved system (perhaps still not perfect). Unfortunately out system is not so fine-tuned and to just ignore such a violation of people’s security and freedom I extremely unjust. | >
> | Proponents for the use of informants like to think of the system as a way to get greater numbers and a greater caliber of criminal off of the street. However, this perception assumes that all of the information obtained from these informants is true. Imagine a person in prison convicted of selling drugs. If this person has knowledge of another individual who sells drugs he may alert authorities and make a deal to cooperate in the investigation of that individual. Although the prisoner may have never interacted with the target of the police investigation, the prisoner has every incentive to take the stand as a witness and testify to being involved in illegal operations with the targeted individual and prosecutors have every incentive to allow that testimony to go forward.
“Who cares? They are criminals anyway! They chose to be involved in criminal activity so they should be aware that there is no honor amongst thieves.” Such a “make your bed now lay in it” attitude may seem fit for the situation of criminals testifying against criminals for reduced sentences. However, that feeling seems to assume the guilt of criminals before they have been tried in court. The real problem comes from the judicial system playing a role in a market as unethical as the one that exists between prosecutors and many informants. Surely if there is no honor amongst thieves, there must be some remnant of it within the criminal justice system.
If all information received by informants was painstakingly and precisely verified then it would be a much improved system (perhaps still not perfect). Unfortunately out system is not so fine-tuned and to just ignore such a violation of people’s security and freedom is extremely unjust. | | | INCENTIVES FOR PROSECUTORS | |
<
< | Prosecutors also become entangled in this system of injustice. For example, an ambitious prosecutor may be compelled to strike a deal with a dangerous criminal in order to secure a conviction of another more high-profile defendant. This system allows for a deal to be struck with a person who admits to nineteen murders, in order to secure the conviction of a “big fish”. See Gravano & Gotti | >
> | Prosecutors also become entangled in this system of injustice. For example, an ambitious prosecutor may be compelled to strike a deal with a dangerous criminal in order to secure the conviction of another more high-profile defendant. This system allows for a deal to be struck with a person who admits to nineteen murders, in order to secure the conviction of a “big fish”. See Gravano & Gotti | | | Undoubtedly prosecutors have pressure to keep conviction rates high. See http://www.tdcaa.com/journal/prosecuting-under-pressure. The benefits of securing high profile convictions are also tantalizing for attorneys. Therefore, the role of the prosecutor becomes about wins and not about deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, or any other proposed justification for the criminal justice system when improper use of informants is rampant. | |
>
> | The negative incentives even trickle down to local police departments, with police officers committing perjury and engaging in illegal tactics in order to keep statistics high and cash from federal funding flowing in. See Why Police Lie Under Oath. | | | Conclusion | |
<
< | As outsiders looking into the system (or even as prosecutors within the system) it is easy to feel as if this type of system isn’t such a bad idea. Maybe some individuals are even largely unaware of the fact that the “snitching” marketplace exists. Unfortunately, those who suffer because of this poorly operated system don’t have the luxury of being unaware of the system. Innocense Project. Another attempt to justify the status quo in society’s current system is to write the occurrence of false testimony as something that can’t be fixed or that doesn’t happen that often, although organization such as the Innocence project might have a different perception of reality. | >
> | As outsiders looking into the system (or even as prosecutors within the system) it is easy to feel as if this type of system isn’t such a bad idea. Maybe some individuals are even largely unaware that the “snitching” marketplace exists. Unfortunately, those who suffer because of this poorly operated system don’t have the luxury of being unaware of the system. Innocense Project. Another attempt to justify the status quo in society’s current system is to write the occurrence of false testimony as something that can’t be fixed or that doesn’t happen that often, although organization such as the Innocence project might have a different perception of reality. | | | No criminal punishment system is perfect. Even still, to turn a blind eye to the injustice that is prevalent in the criminal justice system’s use of informants is disgraceful. To say that using these informants “gets the job done” is to say that individuals are not truly innocent before proven guilty. |
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ChristopherWildsSecondPaper 1 - 09 Apr 2013 - Main.ChristopherWilds
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> | NEGATIVE INCENTIVES INVOLVED IN GOVERNMENT SPONSORED "SNITCHING"
INTRO
I am much more concerned about the loss of life to drugs and to the crime that's going on out there and the need to stop it and protect our innocents and our citizens than I am about anybody's concern over informants. Good Lord. Informants are the way of life in American justice, whether it's a drug issue or not. It's part of our judicial system. It's a good system, if it's run properly.
- Rep. Bill McCollum? (Republican Congressman from Florida's Fifth District. He is Chairman of the House Crime Subcommittee)
What if the system isn’t run properly? What if there is very poor oversight of informants? What if there are tremendous incentives and pressures that cause both criminals, as well as law enforcement personnel to exploit the system for their own personal benefit?
In many instances, informants in criminal cases don’t offer law enforcement personnel information against other criminals out of the goodness of their own hearts. Rather, they strike deals with law enforcement to provide information about other criminals, usually in return for reduced prison sentences. They offer substantial information as “credible sources” to aid authorities in the arrest and conviction of others. Ironically, the same individuals whom the federal government doesn’t believe are telling the truth about their own criminal activities are set forth as valuable, trustworthy sources in their stories regarding other people’s criminal activities. The negative incentives flow both ways. Criminals are given an incentive to make up information regarding others for their own personal gain and law enforcement officials have the incentive to use these “trustworthy” sources to bolster their cases against other individuals and keep conviction rates high.
INCENTIVES FOR CRIMINALS
The federal informant procedures in place currently create incentives for criminals to provide information to law enforcement under false pretenses. In this system, “information” that can lead to an arrest becomes a commodity, to be traded with law enforcement for reduced sentences or to be sold to other criminals to be used as bargaining chips with the federal government. (For a an illustration of this marketplace in action See Snitch Market Illustration
Some informants are even allowed to stay on the streets (in many cases committing crimes with a certain level of impunity) merely because they are willing to give up information on competitors and other criminals. Communities suffer when law enforcement tolerates crimes committed by cooperating offenders, whether it is drug use, property crimes, or violence. Criminals that are willing to give up information on others are compelled to store information on others (or fabricate it) and hold on to that information to use whenever they are caught breaking the law. Does this system seem like a good idea for stopping crime?
Proponents for the use of informants like to think of the system as a way to get greater numbers and greater calibers of criminals off of the street. However, this perception assumes that all of the information obtained from these informants is true. Imagine a person in prison convicted of selling drugs. If this person has knowledge of another individual who sells drugs he may alert authorities and make a deal to cooperate in the investigation of that individual. Although the prisoner may have never interacted with the target of the police investigation, the prisoner has every incentive to take the stand as a witness and testify to being involved in illegal operations with that individual and prosecutors have every incentive to allow that testimony to go forward.
If our criminal justice system was perfect and precisely verified all information received by informants then it would be a much improved system (perhaps still not perfect). Unfortunately out system is not so fine-tuned and to just ignore such a violation of people’s security and freedom I extremely unjust.
INCENTIVES FOR PROSECUTORS
Prosecutors also become entangled in this system of injustice. For example, an ambitious prosecutor may be compelled to strike a deal with a dangerous criminal in order to secure a conviction of another more high-profile defendant. This system allows for a deal to be struck with a person who admits to nineteen murders, in order to secure the conviction of a “big fish”. See Gravano & Gotti
Undoubtedly prosecutors have pressure to keep conviction rates high. See http://www.tdcaa.com/journal/prosecuting-under-pressure. The benefits of securing high profile convictions are also tantalizing for attorneys. Therefore, the role of the prosecutor becomes about wins and not about deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, or any other proposed justification for the criminal justice system when improper use of informants is rampant.
Conclusion
As outsiders looking into the system (or even as prosecutors within the system) it is easy to feel as if this type of system isn’t such a bad idea. Maybe some individuals are even largely unaware of the fact that the “snitching” marketplace exists. Unfortunately, those who suffer because of this poorly operated system don’t have the luxury of being unaware of the system. Innocense Project. Another attempt to justify the status quo in society’s current system is to write the occurrence of false testimony as something that can’t be fixed or that doesn’t happen that often, although organization such as the Innocence project might have a different perception of reality.
No criminal punishment system is perfect. Even still, to turn a blind eye to the injustice that is prevalent in the criminal justice system’s use of informants is disgraceful. To say that using these informants “gets the job done” is to say that individuals are not truly innocent before proven guilty.
-- ChristopherWilds - 09 Apr 2013 |
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