I think I see what you are saying, but are you maybe stating the point too strongly? Very few events are "direct" causes of social change. One could argue that a dictators decree in an authoritarian system is only effective to the degree that it is interpreted by the people and groups that form the system, yet it probably does have social consequence. High court decisions clearly have some social consequence (though indirect), and I am not sure why it would be "more pragmatic" to view their capacity for change as centered on the microlevel... Don't we want to be aware that judicial decisions are influencing society, albeit indirectly?

My understanding of Cohen's point was that judicial decisions are nexuses of social force. They are not independent events that shape society, nor are they effectless endpoints of social forces.

To invoke the overused metaphor of the human body, the human endocrine (hormone) system is a good example of a feedback device that is, in itself, neither a end nor a beginning. The release of a hormone has no "direct" effect, and is the result of a vast web of physiological interactions. Although it is extraordinarily complex, it seems strange to argue that we should only look at hormone regulation in a local and limited context, when clearly each "hormonal event" is the result and cause of changes throughout the body.

-- TheodoreSmith - 03 Feb 2008

I agree – there seems to be a lot more “maintaining” than “changing” coming from courts, regardless of the level of the court and what its functions are. And, whatever a court decides, it is often other people in other capacities (legislators, interest groups, organizations, the police) who respond in the ways that seem to impact society at large in more direct ways. Because of the way our legal and governmental structures are set up and interrelate, anything a court decides is “filtered” through other people, organizations, and groups who have an interest in the decision before you start seeing any significant or notable impact. And the impact isn’t always what the court expected, either, because those interpreting a decision apply their own judgment and motivations to the mix (I’ve seen this in local government a lot). My opinion: there are always at least three degrees of separation (and evolution) between you and any judicial decision (unless, as you say, your name is on the docket).

-- BarbPitman - 02 Feb 2008

I will concede that judicial decisions might indirectly produce social change, either by promoting the other branches to act (Congress in the wake of Brown enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964) or by mobilizing segments of society to mobilize in the wake of an unfavorable or controversial judicial decision (the pro-life movement in the wake of Roe). But, overall, I think that the courts are ineffective at producing change on a large-scale. I think it's more pragmatic to view the courts (and lawyers) as better equipped to produce micro-level change for those individuals who actually appear before the court, but that it is detrimental to harbor a false hope that the law and judges can change the world. While I'm not sure if Felix Cohen's conception of judicial decisions really does impart that much power to the branch to produce social consequences, I think it would have added much to his piece if he clarified what he meant by "an index of social consequences."

Does anyone else agree or disagree?

-- CaseyBoyle - 02 Feb 2008

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