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UNDER REVISION. To see the paper as submitted, including all of Eben's comments, click here.
To see my responses to Eben's comments, including my goals in revision, click here. |
| | These models illustrate a problem with how criminal laws are made. Social events easily shift the harshness of penalties upwards, but there is little at work to mobilize the population to diminish penalties.
Proportionality in sentencing, using weak or limited retributivism as a constitutional cap on penalties. |
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< | One of the purposes of our constitution is to protect the minority's rights against the will of the majority. Thus, a constitutional guarantee that punishment and pain inflicted by the government must not be disproportionate to the criminal offense will be able to protect citizens from punishments easily ratcheted up by social events, but not easily ratcheted down. |
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> | The current status of proportionality in United States law. |
| | Proportionality is at once a difficult and easy concept to define. Proportionality feels intuitive. We would all agree that a two-hundred dollar fine for murder is too lenient or that a sentence of five years for jaywalking is disproportionate to the point where it offends our sense of justice. However, when we attempt to circumscribe exactly what proportional means definition alludes us. |
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< | Part of the problem is answering the question of what ends the proportionality serves. Proportionality can serve deterrent principals by punishing only enough to deter the criminal behavior,
rehabilitation principals by punishing no more than necessary so that the criminal understands the harm that she has committed,
- Since when is punishment a good way of teaching anybody anything?
or retributivism principals by punishing until society believes that the scales of justice are even for the offense [2].
In current jurisprudence on the 8th Amendment the supreme court has understood a guarantee of proportionality so long as the punishment satisfies one of the ends of proportional punishment [7]. Commentators have noted that this interpretation serves little purpose because there is no cap to the pain that may be inflicted under a deterrent justification [3] [7].
We advocate a position of “weak“ retributivism, where retributivism provides a cap on the pain endured by the offender relative to the harm he has committed, but other principals can be applied up to that point. This is the interpretation adopted in Europe, where every system subscribes to some version of the principle [11]. The European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that “the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offense“ [13].
- But we are not there, we are here. In our case, proportionality as a concept must be read out of language used in 1689 in the Bill of Rights, and copied into American constitutions, including the Federal Bill of Rights, that "cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted," which grounds two other meanings of proportionality: that punishment shall not reach an absolute limit of inhumanity that constitutes cruelty, and that it must not be meted out inequitably, so that some people are punished unusually.
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- Another possible reading of "unusual," that I have some affinity for, is that it means "uncommon" or "not regularly meted out." While losing some of the individual protection that the "inequity" interpretation provides, it would serve as an absolute bar to some of the punishments that our system only rarely uses (the death penalty being a prime example). -- AdamCarlis 8 May 2008
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> | Part of the problem is answering the question of what ends the proportionality serves. According to the United States Sentencing Commission the purposes of punishment are "just punishment [retributivism], deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation" [14]. In current jurisprudence on non capital cases concerning the 8th Amendment's guarantee of proportionality the supreme court has understood proportionality to be satisfied so long as one of the ends of punishment are addressed [7]. Commentators have noted that this interpretation serves little purpose because there is no cap to the pain that may be inflicted under a deterrent justification [3] [7]. |
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< | Consequences of a constitutional protection against disproportionate sentences. |
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> | What this means is that under our current system legislatures may impose harsh jail time for any offense they deem to be serious, such as repeatated nonviolent thefts. This concept of proportionality does not protect the minority against penalty escalation, and leaves the decision of how much punishment is too much up to a majority easily influenced by outrage and moral panics. |
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< | Increased scrutiny for length of prison sentences
If there was a protection against disproportionate sentences then at every sentencing a judge would have to answer the question of whether the sentence proportional to the offense committed, subject to review of higher courts. This increased scrutiny would have courts addressing the issue of proportionality in jurisprudence, where protective guidelines would be addressed and followed. This would have the effect of harsh sentencing schemes proposed by the legislature held unconstitutional. |
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> | Using weak retributivism as a constitutional cap on penalties.
One of the purposes of our constitution is to protect the minority's rights against the will of the majority. Thus, a constitutional guarantee that punishment and pain inflicted by the government must not violate retributist principals will be able to protect citizens from punishments easily ratcheted up by social events, but not easily ratcheted down. The question then becomes how to define in jurisprudence when a punishment becomes disproportionate to the offense. |
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- But we have been using such a scheme, consisting a sentencing guidelines with a requirement to justify departures below and above, and that scheme--whatever its constitutionality--did not reduce the savagery of US sentences. Hadn't you better explain why it didn't work before asserting that it would?
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> | We advocate a definition of “weak“ retributivism, where retributivism provides a cap on the pain endured by the offender relative to the harm he has committed, but other principals can be applied up to that point. This is the interpretation adopted in Europe, where every system subscribes to some version of the principle [11]. The European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that “the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offense“ [13]. |
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- I think my lack of clarity about what type of proportionality I was arguing for in the heading is the reason for this comment. The sentencing commission attempts to incorporate "just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation" into the guidelines. With an guarantee of 'weak' retributivism the guidelines themselves would have to be restructured and there would begin to be jurisprudence drawing hard lines (for example, 'no more than 3 years for theft of less than 100,000k') that the legislature could not exceed.
A Check against moral panics
Pettit concludes his exploration of the outrage dynamic by recommending a politically insulated policy board to set sentences for crimes, thereby breaking the cycle of punishment escalation [10]. However, this politically insulated body already exists in the judicial branch of government. A constitutional guarantee of not more than proportional punishment would provide a mechanism to strike down punishments deemed too harsh, thus stopping the cycle of escalation in punishments.
- But we have one, and it does not. So perhaps we'd better ask why not?
A new jurisdictional hook for prison reform
The terrible conditions in prison have been well documented [9]. If criminals were guaranteed proportional punishment, the ability to send a criminal to a United States jail at all for some crimes could be challenged. Then, courts would be able to impose the choice: clean up jails or have no jail time for some classes of offense.
- I don't understand this assertion. If the legislature elected by the public thinks that some crime deserves a punishment of imprisonment, what is the basis for holding that it does not, or that jail conditions are relevant to why it does not? Apparently you have an argument in mind, but I cannot find out what it is from the text.
- The idea here was that courts could distinguish between the degree of punishment for detention and the degree of punishment for detention in terrible conditions. Thus, for some classes of crime it would be possible that detention would be acceptable, but detention in jails as they are would be unacceptable. Regardless, the idea is not very important to this paper, has some holes, and will likely be cut when I figure out how to reformat my middle section.
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> | Pettit concludes his exploration of the outrage dynamic by recommending a politically insulated policy board to set sentences for crimes, thereby breaking the cycle of punishment escalation [10]. However, this politically insulated body already exists in the judicial branch of government. A protection against sentences violating retributist principals would force the judge to answer the question of whether the sentence imposed by the legislature was proportional to the offense committed at every sentencing, subject to review of higher courts. This increased scrutiny would have courts addressing the issue of proportionality in jurisprudence, where protective guidelines would be addressed and followed. This would have the effect of harsh sentencing schemes proposed by the legislature held unconstitutional, breaking the cycle of punishment escalation. |
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[1] Folk Devils and Moral Panics, |
| | [13] Charter of Fundemental Rights of the European Union |
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- This is an interesting and potentially excellent essay, but I don't understand why it proceeds as though a constitutional requirement of proportionality would be something new in the US. I think your real subject is why our existing proportionality review doesn't work as you would have us believe it must.
- I've been looking to spot the place where my argument becomes unclear. I think it is in my section on proportionality where my main thesis gets swallowed by definitions and trying to address the swirling waters of 8th amendment jurisprudence. The section attempts to convey three related points.
- The unclear definition of proportionality (beyond our intuitions) makes it a difficult legal term to apply.
- The supreme court interprets proportionality of punishment statutes (excepting life sentinces and death) as 'can this punishment conceivably be related to a goal of punishment'.
- We need a constitutional guarantee for what is known as 'weak' retributivism to protect us from how criminal laws are made.
- I think I further confused the final point with my heading title in the next section. I should have made explicit what type of proportionality I was arguing for - that was a blunder.
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> | [14] An Overview of the United States Sentincing Commision
December, 2007. |
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- I think the way forward is to revamp the section on proportionality, trying to make my intention clearer and focus on why the 8th amendment as interpreted by the court does not offer the protection that we deserve. Further comments on something I may have missed, or other methods towards improvement are very welcome.
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