It's difficult to understand this draft, because it uses "objective" and "subjective" in ways that don't seem to bear any relation to their usual meaning. "Objective" seems to mean "eternal and impervious to all change," so that any legal proposition is "not objective" if it is modifiable by judges. Thus the entirety of the common law consists of "not-objective" principles (which I think is used here as a synonym for both "rules" and "standards" as they are ordinarily professionally used, despite the differences). Why high-level constitutional law would be a good place to look for eternal unchanging rules, I have no idea, but the very complex and not-very-clear example of Plessy and Brown appears to teach us that constitutional law in the US, like all of common law, is "not-objective."

"Subjective," however, seems to mean "arbitrary." Why the world should be divided into "principles" that are eternally unchangeable without regard to social epoch or situation, on the one hand, or arbitrary "whimsy" on the other isn't explained. Most jurisprudence presumes that it is required to explain only phenomena falling in between these extremes, which is assumed to be all practicably occurring phenomena.

The root of that argument appears to lie in a psychology that denies human conduct is informed by both primary unconscious and secondary rational processes. Radical lateralization has taken place, without so much as a whisper of corpus callosum in the house. Everything is either a left-brain algorithm or a whim of the right-brain. If judges are not performing an algebra that never changes they are rioting in an orgy of rulelessness.

It seems to me we want to back up to the first step. What is the idea at the center of the draft? Can we state it without requiring a primitive or reductive psychology on which to rest it? Can we use terms in their ordinary senses to express the idea, or do we need to conscript for some reason language with precise other meanings to serve our purpose? Can we develop the idea at the center of the draft without having to commit ourselves to a strong separation between "politics" and "law" in all cases, or is this a theory that requires us to believe that law is or should be a formal system independent of other social processes that accumulate and distribute power?