Law in Contemporary Society

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LukeReillyFirstEssay 5 - 29 Mar 2015 - Main.MattBurke
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 I like your application of reader-response theory (or something like it) to judging and statutory interpretation, but I'm not sure I agree with some of your claims. First, do judges really let authorship die when they interpret opinions? Don't they often (sometimes overtly) consider the historical context and intentions of the author? Otherwise, if there is no platonic correctness, what is a judge's "understanding" of an opinion besides what she thinks the law should be? Second, doesn't your argument that we can't rely on legislators to express their unconscious intent lead to the (ironic) conclusion that we shouldn't trust them to distinguish their "holding" (the text of the statute) from their "dicta" (legislative history) either? If majority opinions of judges are subject to the same issues of individual intents, unconscious intents, etc., would you prefer that judges just give us an order or outcome without the discursive rationalizations (distinctions between carrots and potatoes) that follow?

-- HenryRoss - 28 Mar 2015

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Building on Shay and Henry, how do you contend with the differences between common law and statutes regarding (for starters) their historical geneses and present modes of enactment?

-- MattBurke - 29 Mar 2015

 
 
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Revision 5r5 - 29 Mar 2015 - 12:22:55 - MattBurke
Revision 4r4 - 28 Mar 2015 - 05:43:19 - HenryRoss
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