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AliAbidFirstEssay 1 - 26 Oct 2024 - Main.AliAbid
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstEssay" |
Pakistan's Net of Control
-- By AliAbid - 26 Oct 2024
Introduction
On May 9th, 2023, the recently ousted Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan was arrested and subsequently remains jailed. His popularity with the public resulted in vast outrage amongst citizens throughout the country. The Pakistani government likely predicted mass protests were going to outbreak, so they prepared countermeasures. They suspended mobile internet access and social media apps countrywide. They wanted to control the narratives and reactions to the arrest, but the will of the Pakistani people is strong. Citizens across the country still mobilized for widespread protests and showcased their sentiments towards the government.
This was not the first time the Pakistani government manipulated internet access to exert their will over its people. Digital surveillance and censorship in Pakistan have been central to the government’s approach to establish control over the populace for some time.
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How Do They Have This Power?
The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) of 2016 strengthened the legal basis for the expansion of the government’s power to monitor online activities and prosecute individuals suspected of cybercrimes. While officially intended to combat issues like terrorism and hate speech, the vagueness of PECA provides the government with considerable discretion to investigate and prosecute people suspected of activities they consider a threat to national security, political stability or religious standards. The ambiguity in defining these factors allows PECA to provide legal justification for the implementation of mass online surveillance and censorship without much regulatory oversight. Having such discretion has resulted in problematic outcomes.
Through its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan utilizes a mass surveillance system called the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS). Taken forcefully from telecom companies, this system can intercept and monitor calls, text messages, emails and web browsing histories. Likely due to PECA, the government has been operating the LIMS without proper public transparency and regulatory oversight. The ability for a government to stifle democratic and public discourse with this kind of surveillance system is unbound. They can easily target political opponents and “troublesome” public figures, such as Imran Khan, and find justification for utilizing the law to silence them.
Another method Pakistan uses to exhibit control is internet filtering and content blocking. Under the governmental agency, the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA), the country enforces the blocking of websites, social media platforms and mobile apps containing material that they have the capacity to deem harmful. Again, what they deem harmful is a vague standard and could essentially be deemed anything. It could range from websites critical of the government, being perceived as undermining religious values or due to national security concerns. This brand of filtering clearly constricts widespread public discourse and open access to information. The result is a heavily monitored internet where surveillance on social media platforms like Facebook and Instagram discourages citizens from voicing their opinions openly, especially if those opinions challenge governmental authority.
The Resulting Fragility
The motivations behind Pakistan’s internet surveillance and censorship seem far from noble. While national security concerns are often elicited as the reasons for these practices, with the government arguing that surveillance prevents terrorist attacks and extremist groups from operating unchecked, other motivations are likely social and political control. Monitoring and censoring content that criticizes government, military, or religious establishments allow the government to suppress dissidents and control narratives. This results in an environment where citizens, journalists and opposing politicians operate under the surveilled eye of those in power. The veil of privacy is long gone. Citizens are becoming more and more aware that their private messages, browsing history and social media posts are able to be monitored. Many Pakistanis now avoid discussing political issues online, fearing retaliation from the government. This results in a climate of self-censorship that severely limits open discourse.
The impact of internet surveillance and censorship also disproportionately affects marginalized communities, who may lack the resources to protect their privacy online. Pakistan is a developing country where internet is not necessarily available to the population as a whole. Wealthier individuals or those with more technological know-how can use tools like VPNs to attempt to avoid government monitoring and website censorship, while less privileged people may not be able to afford or even be aware of these tools. This disparity worsens existing inequalities, as marginalized groups are potentially more exposed to online surveillance and have access to a more censored internet.
A Reason to Change?
Addressing the pervasive issues of internet surveillance and censorship in Pakistan requires a nuanced approach that balances the actual security needs of the country while still respecting democratic principles. Legal reforms that narrow the scope of surveillance and establish clear and transparent boundaries are essential to ensuring that surveillance practices are used solely for legitimate security purposes. Providing public awareness of reasonable limitations to free speech would allow for more limited infringement of violations.
Allowing citizens a more open internet also allows for more opportunities to seek education, access to job prospects and increases the investment potential for the country’s growing tech sector. Investors are more likely to put money into Pakistan’s tech market if they did not have the risk of the government shutting internet access to the entire country. Money talks and these potential benefits would serve the governmental interest of bolstering the country’s economy.
Conclusion
All in all, internet surveillance and censorship in Pakistan reflect an ongoing struggle between the purported democratic values of the country and the government’s desire to maintain over its citizens. While the country cites security as a justification for these practices, these measures are often tools for political control and suppression of dissent. To protect democratic values, Pakistan must reform its approach to internet control as to allow for a more unfiltered space to disseminate information and discourse.
Works Cited
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/08/pakistan-authorities-must-be-transparent-about-internet-disruptions-and-surveillance-tech/
https://www.dawn.com/news/1864073/caught-in-the-web-surveillance-data-protection-and-ai-in-pakistan
https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/pakistan-expands-surveillance-powers-yet-again-in-the-name-of-national-security/
https://www.techradar.com/computing/cyber-security/pakistans-internet-is-under-siege-and-vpns-are-a-target
https://advox.globalvoices.org/2024/07/18/pakistans-intelligence-agencies-gain-legal-cover-for-surveillance/
https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-internet-disruptions-cybersecurity-firewall-elections-de408fbd514aa754fdbbf44e0f462070#
https://www.dawn.com/news/1817327
https://www.techpolicy.press/pakistan-on-verge-of-techno-authoritarian-turn/
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