In the spirit of some concerns posted on the discussion under the rubric of free speech, I would like to turn some ears over to Cohen's gloss on Hobbes's conception of the 'state' as an institution channeling our collective force, which, I think, calls into question many ethical issues noteworthy for our discussion: "The process by which government is created and its commands formulated is a process of human bargaining, based upon mutual consent but weighted by the relative power of conflicting individuals or groups" (837). This statement is overflowing with theoretical richness and practical significance: (1) creation of government and formulation of laws stem from continuous negotiations between private individuals and collective interests; (2) the terms of the offer generated by this bargaining is accepted and consented to; (3) and yet everybody's influence in this process is not on an equal playing field, but, rather, is separated along lines of relative and unequal densities, assigned, in this choir, tenor and baritone voices according to the social order of "mutual consent...weighted by the relative power of conflicting individuals or groups."

This reading of Hobbes implies a danger largely prevalent in our society: corruption. To return to a familiar question: Why has the chief clerk of the Supreme Court found so much resistance in Congress to change the judicial register by dividing opinions into numbered paragraphs as to render it more legible? Because mutual consent in our contemporary society brings with it a crucial caveat - mutual does not mean equal, and the law is not indifferent to the refracted forces at play. I wonder whether there is hidden in this idea an echo of Holmes's distinction, quoting Hegel, between the appetite and the opinion, money and the command of ideas. It would be great to hear your thoughts on (1) the 'practicality' of the Hobbesian world (2) the potential for corruption in this model and (3) how much our process disguises and consequently legitimizes this corruption with political and legal rhetoric and systems, "appeals to reason or goodness" (837)?

-- JesseCreed - 29 Jan 2008

I don't know if I understand the question.

To the extent I do get it, here are my thoughts:

(1) Leaving Hobbes aside--I read all of six pages of him in college--I don't know if I see that quote as concealing any danger about corruption. If anything, it does the opposite.

It seems to me that Cohen here isn't putting forth a comprehensive theory of actual government so much as he's pointing out that a useful definition of government shouldn’t be drawn from ideals about the world, but from social actualities (838). If I read his definition as concealing corruption, then Cohen would be trying to conform the social actualities to his definition, not vice versa. I don’t think this is what he’s going for.

(2) I think his definition does make room for the role of corruption in at least two places. Corruption could be seen as an example of the "relative power of conflicting individuals or groups" that's involved in creating government. Or, drawing on Cohen's quote that "governments do not arise once and for all," corruption could be seen as one of the forces outside of lawful government, working against it.

(3) I think I get your (3), though I think the question might be less if our “process” disguises corruption and more if our common definitions do. At least for me, I don’t think I learned about the role political corruption in government in any high school history course. Instead, we talked about our government as it’s set up in the Constitution. But if corruption does play a big role in our government, then it seems a useful definition should take it into account.

(4) Apologies if I misunderstood your post or Cohen’s text. Or both.