Political Psychology & Authoritarianism in America

-- By AnnieIsabel - 14 May 2025

Democracy has always been a contested project, vulnerable to both internal contradiction and external pressure. Today, it faces an especially acute test–rooted in structural weaknesses and psychological dynamics that enable authoritarianism to take hold (CAP 2025; Snyder 2024; Snyder 2017). Though the United States retains important institutional advantages over countries where authoritarian rule has taken firmer hold, these safeguards are not self-sustaining (Levitsky & Way 2025). The Constitution, for all its strengths, cannot guarantee democratic outcomes without active support from institutions, civil society, and a public committed to the rule of law (Id.). Authoritarianism often emerges not through dramatic rupture, but through legal manipulations, norm violations, and the erosion of institutional independence (Snyder 2017; CAP 2025). In such moments, complacency is not neutral—it is an accelerant (CAP 2025). Understanding why democracy is vulnerable requires close attention to political psychology, especially the mechanisms by which authoritarian appeals gain traction in instability (Zaller 1992; Stenner 2005). But beyond diagnosis, democratic actors must rebuild institutional foundations from within (CAP 2025; Levitsky & Way 2025).

Political psychology shows that public opinion is not inherently stable or ideologically consistent (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). It is shaped by cues, symbols, and emotional triggers—especially in times of stress (Lodge & Taber 2013; Iyengar & Kinder 1987). Research shows that most individuals process political information through bias and that political reasoning often follows motivated cognition, not deliberation (Zaller 1992; Lodge & Taber 2013). This dynamic creates openings for authoritarian leaders to exploit fear and frame conflict in identity-driven terms (Stenner 2005; Snyder 2024). Trump’s political strategy exemplifies this dynamic (Snyder 2024). His rhetoric emphasizes existential threats—immigration, crime, internal enemies—which primes loyalty and fear over policy or process (Zaller 1992; Iyengar & Kinder 1987). This strategy, rooted in historical authoritarianism, prioritizes emotional dominance over coherence (Snyder 2024). Messages of betrayal and decline displace democratic reasoning and justify exceptional measures (Id.; Lodge & Taber 2013). Karen Stenner terms this reaction “authoritarian predisposition”—a latent preference for order and conformity triggered by perceived breakdown (Stenner 2005; Altemeyer 1996). Though dormant in stability, this trait is easily activated under threat (Stenner 2005). The danger is not limited to ideological authoritarians, as non-authoritarians may adopt authoritarian views when they feel society is under siege (Id.; Snyder 2017). This explains growing polarization and punitive attitudes across the spectrum (Stenner 2005; Snyder 2024).

U.S. institutions offer resilience but also deep vulnerabilities (Levitsky & Way 2025; CAP 2025). Compared to Hungary or Turkey, the U.S. benefits from federalism, a bicameral legislature, an independent judiciary, and a robust civil society (Levitsky & Way 2025). These features make authoritarian consolidation harder, but they are not immune to exploitation (Id.; Snyder 2017). Trump’s first term showed how constitutional ambiguity and institutional fragmentation can expand executive power and undermine oversight (Levitsky & Way 2025). Even well-designed constitutions contain exploitable gaps (Id.). The same legal system that enabled Jim Crow, Japanese internment, and McCarthyism? have allowed a president to pressure state officials, target critics, and politicize federal agencies (Id.). Institutional design must be reinforced with formal rules, political culture, and civic mobilization (CAP 2025). Codifying judicial independence and oversight—though long-term goals—serve as essential bulwarks when protections fail (Id.). Without them, backsliding proceeds under legal cover, diminishing effective opposition (Id.; Snyder 2017).

The U.S. is not alone in facing these challenges (CAP 2025). Democracies across Europe have implemented structural reforms to preempt obstruction and fortify institutional independence (Id.). Germany reduced procedural hurdles in the Bundesrat and clarified federal-state authority, allowing for more responsive governance (Id.). “Cutoff motions” and “mediation committees” deescalated partisan conflict and encouraged cross-party dialogue (Id.). Such measures are not cosmetic but prevent procedural manipulation by extremist actors (Id.). Spain’s “guillotine motion”—mandating a vote after a set debate period—stabilized democracy in its post-Franco era (Id.). More recently, Poland’s pro-democracy coalition began reversing judicial capture by requiring supermajorities for appointments, depoliticizing oversight bodies, and instituting age and officeholding restrictions (Id.). These are practical, targeted responses to democratic erosion, grounded in the recognition that broken norms don’t self-repair (Id.). The U.S. would benefit from similar reforms. Setting appointment standards, streamlining legislative rules, and reinforcing oversight would improve institutional resilience without depending on leaders’ goodwill (CAP 2025). These efforts are most effective when enacted before decay becomes irreversible—but legitimacy can still be restored even after damage occurs (Id.).

Institutions are only as strong as the public commitment sustaining them (Verba et al. 1995; Levitsky & Way 2025). Civil society—encompassing media, unions, universities, and civic groups—plays a vital role in this foundation (Levitsky & Way 2025). In the U.S., civil society remains pluralistic and relatively well-resourced (Id.). Its dispersion of power across non-state actors has historically served as a buffer against overreach (Id.). But civil society cannot defend democracy passively (Id.). When judges, journalists, and educators self-censor or disengage, anti-democratic norms take root unchallenged (Snyder 2017; CAP 2025).Cross-sector engagement—linking lawmakers, think tanks, and grass-roots organizers—can form the connective infrastructure of democratic resistance (CAP 2025). These networks become vital when institutional levers are compromised (Id.).

The threat to American democracy arises not only from leadership or partisanship but from the convergence of psychological vulnerability, institutional fragility, and structural inequality (Zaller 1992; CAP 2025). While significant advantages remain—civil society, federalism, constitutional separation—these must be actively maintained (Levitsky & Way 2025). Democratic reinforcement requires clarifying legislative processes, safeguarding judicial independence, expanding voting access, and resisting politics rooted in fear and exclusion (CAP 2025). These are not theoretical aspirations but proven, actionable responses (Id.). They reflect the view that democracy must be fortified from within (Id.). Defending democracy is not about crisis rhetoric or alarmism (Snyder 2017). It is about long-term maintenance and adaptation, which can be sustained by resolve, implemented through institutions, and carried forward by coalitions of engaged citizens (CAP 2025; Levitsky & Way 2025).

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