Romney's Plan for 2012

-- By AdamGold? - 12 Feb 2008

Romney's Approach for dropping out in 2008

Mitt Romney, exemplifying Arnold’s idea that politics uses nonsense as its ordinary form of communication, stated that he, “Simply cannot let (his) campaign, be a part of aiding a surrender to terror,” in his bow out speech on February 7th, 2008. While this statement, on its face, flies against minimal logic and reasoning, it warrants a deeper analysis because it is seemingly representative of a greater strategy with which Romney might be able to put himself on track to be the leading Republican nominee in 2012.

Arnold would agree that the logic and content regarding the threat of terror and its relation to the Republican Party vis a vis Romney is the least important aspect to analyze with regard to understanding what Romney was trying to achieve with his statement. It, in practice, represents a greater plan to give unity and morale to his prospective conservative powerbase for a presidential bid in 2012; it is ceremonial and designed to create enthusiasm, to increase faith and quiet doubt about his status as the future leader of the party and nation. Thus, a more interesting analysis shall focus on what his statement was designed to accomplish and whether it is likely to succeed.

II. What was Romney attempting to achieve by issuing the statement?

A. Avoid Political embarrassment

In the immediacy, Romney was practicing damage control. Despite millions of dollars and top tier status in the media, his campaign strategy did not produce adequate results, especially in Iowa and South Carolina. Romney sought to draw attention away from his poor delegate total, which a thinking man might perceive as a sign of weakness or personal dislike, and instead focus it on his graciousness in deferring to the Party interest in the hope of further protecting the nation from terror.

To citizens on the outside of the conservative republican locus, these sentiments are utterly unconvincing and it is obvious he lost because he was not good enough or he had too many detracting qualities. However, to Romney’s potential backers, his approach to dropping out was an appealing sign that he is a prudent leader who recognizes that the Republicans must maintain their focus as protectors of the union’s security.

B. Prepare for 2012

The terror threat is the strongest common thread that runs across the Republican constituency spectrum. Rich businessmen fear market interruption and instability, rural farmers fear a rise in gasoline prices, Evangelicals fear a diametrically-opposed evil power threatening Christendom, and so on. Though internally contradictory, in that these groups often have opposed or even competing interests, terror appeals to all segments of the powerbase necessary to give him the Republican nomination in 2012.

1) Terror Stands for Our Good v. Their Evil

Romney’s approach to dropping out of the race properly draws attention away from the issues relevant to voters so as to not exclude any potential voter from his umbrella of influence. Instead, he highlights a pseudo religious appeal to Evangelicals, by far the most populous single group requisite to securing a nomination, because it creates an “us” vs, “them” in whom the “us” includes Evangelicals as well as Mormons to mitigate any fears of his faith. Romney, thus, alludes to this grand struggle to provide some, albeit internally inconsistent, reassurance that he is on the side of good and this is an issue that will continue to be relevant well into his future candidacy.

2) True Conservative In Waiting

Romney also sees his timing as premature in 2008. More importantly, he recognizes, in terms of a calculated gamble, that the next president will likely be unsuccessful at uniting the nation and solving the economic and military issues the US will face. He is betting that Obama or Clinton will alienate and anger his prime constituency with liberal policies and inexperienced mismanagement to cause a return-to-conservative-values sentiment much like in 2000 after the various Clinton scandals. In addition, he recognizes that there is an equal chance that McCain? , even if elected president, will so offend the conservative base with more liberal stances on immigration and other meaty issues as make Romney the answer for the party. His bow-out speech and subsequent CPAC address should be seen as his attempt to give Reagan’s 1976 RNC address to set himself up as a Party “uniter” and heir apparent. Romney desires to be seen as a true conservative who can provide leadership and accountability much like Reagan was perceived as doing for eight years.

III. Will this work?

Arnold wrote that the gradual decline and fall of social institutions are not the result of revolutionary ideas held by their opponents; it is the product of phobias against practical common sense action produced by their own ideas. Taking this into consideration, Romney’s strategy for 2012 could work. His focus on true conservatism and economic and terror management might be necessary to secure the Party’s nomination, but it will not be sufficient without accompanying new ideas and a fresh pragmatism. However, for his gamble to pay off, a variety of external factors must also occur to alienate the traditional Republican powerbase further than it already is to allow a Reagan-like figure to step in and unite the Party again - this time not under threat of Communism, but under threat of terror.